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ABSTRACT
The focus of this study is on Indonesia's failure 
to maintain a constitutional democracy following inde­
pendence from Dutch colonial rule and the subsequent 
transition to the alternative system of "guided1* or 
tutelary democracy, a variant of authoritarian rule.
The underlying assumption is that political dynamics 
in the plural developing societies like Indonesia be­
come more intelligible if analyzed in relation to both 
structural conditions and the response made to these 
conditions by political leaders and/or organizations.
Some of the structural characteristics may or may not 
be conflict-producing in the political sphere. Whether 
they are is often dependent on how they are manipulated 
by competing individuals and/or groups within the society.
Our analysis shows that the inability of the po­
litical leadership to control conflict between regional 
groups was the single most important factor accounting 
for the failure to sustain a political democracy. This 
inability is attributed to divisions within the elite 
with regard to the system itself, its legitimacy and 
value for Indonesia. Leaders who were committed to the 
new system and attempted to deal with the conflict under 
the existing framework of the parliamentary system were 
eventually replaced by those who sought to take control 
by exacerbating conflict between regions and thus by 
destroying the power of Parliament. A split in the na­
tional leadership broke the main integrating force in 
the new nation, a commitment by the elite to constitu­
tional democracy.
v
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant international developments 
since the end of World War II has been the birth of the new 
nations of Asia and Africa. Many of these countries have 
experienced considerable social, economic, and political 
instability during their short life spans. Nation-building 
has been especially difficult for those plural societies 
whose national boundaries are often a legacy from the co­
lonial past. They are characterized by deep and mutually- 
reinforcing cleavages which divide ethnic, racial, religious, 
and regional minorities, with each group, to a large extent, 
living its own life as a constituent element in the plural 
social system. They are, J. S. Purnivall writes, societies 
where "two or more elements or social orders live side by 
side, yet without mingling, in one political unit."^ Na­
tional integration is tenuous with several loci of power and 
an absence of common social, economic, and political demands. 
The Nigerian civil war, the struggle between East and West 
Pakistan, and the South Sudan separatist revolt are examples
■^J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural 
Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), P^  5^6. 
For elaboration of concept, see Chapter XIII.
2
3of upheavals in the developing plural nations* There are 
also varying degrees of plural character exhibited in the 
Western world by the black and white cleavage in the United 
States, religious conflict in Northern Ireland, and the 
French provinces of Canada.
All societies display some structural segmentation, 
but the developing plural nations display rather extreme 
degrees of "cultural" pluralism. Deep divisions separate 
distinct, isolated, and self-contained population groups. 
Social communication across boundary lines is minimal. 
Whereas, the "socially" plural nation has subcultural vari­
ations on a dominant theme of values, the "culturally" 
plural nation displays the existence of several value sy­
stems which coexist side by side. They may converge at 
some points, but they also are subject to tension and con­
flict between subsystems. Such fragmented structures are 
highly amenable to dissension and hostilities instead of 
consensus and cooperation. In the case of the new nations, 
conflict between elements has often been activated by power 
struggles between segments of the political elite following
p
independence. Some leaders have found it politically ex­
pedient to manipulate conflict between societal units in an
p
The term elite refers to persons who have major de­
cision-making prerogatives in the production or ending of 
political crises. See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Consti­
tutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1962), p. 108. See also Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: 
Who Gets What. When. How (New York: Meridian Books, 1958),
pp. 13-27.
4effort to find support among groups and strata. These na­
tions have the additional problem of rapid social change 
occurring within traditional social structures. Some 
peoples have found it difficult to adjust to Western ideas 
of political and economic modernization. If these nations 
are to succeed in their goals of nation-building, they must 
fashion political systems capable of managing the forces of 
instability which nationalism and independence seem to have 
loosed.
The present work is an attempt to present a sociologi­
cal case study of Indonesia, one of the new plural nations 
of Southeast Asia. Our major substantive concern is with 
the country's inability to sustain a system of liberal demo­
cracy and the transition to “guided" or tutelary democracy, 
a variant of authoritarian rule.^  The years of the study, 
19^9 through 1959, comprise the initial decade of indepen­
dence from Dutch colonial control. By 1959, it was obvious 
that extra-parliamentary forces, namely the President and 
the army, had gained control of the government and a major 
redistribution of power had occurred. The study emphasizes
3 In our study, liberal democracy refers to a system of 
government which permits the governed to select political 
leaders, i.e., has an institutionalized means of opposition.
An authoritarian polity lacks this duality. They may be 
viewed as ideal types at opposite ends of a continuum, how­
ever, in reality, polities combine elements of both. A tu­
telary democracy adopts the formal structures of a democratic 
polity, but functions mainly as an authoritarian regime with 
heavy concentration of power in the executive branch of govern 
ment. See Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman,.eds., The 
Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton Uni­
versity Press, I960), pp. 568-570.
5how this shift in power was closely related to changing re­
lations "between regional blocs within the Indonesian archi­
pelago. The active role of Parliament in the political de­
cision-making process drastically declined, as relations de­
teriorated between Java and the outer islands. There is an 
attempt to show how much of the political unrest between 
regions and the subsequent failure of the new system was 
linked to intense power struggles within a badly fragmented 
leadership. In the absence of at least a minimal amount of 
consensus on basic points, namely the maintenance of the new 
system, political democracy was doomed to failure.
The most salient conclusion of the study is that the 
fate of new nations such as Indonesia rests, in large measure, 
on the orientations and activities of political leaders. The 
attempt to build up a modern national state out of a plurality 
of distinct regional cultures requires the fullest mobiliza­
tion of leadership resources that are available. It demands 
an active and committed leadership willing to participate in 
the reorganization of the nation in terms of a political sy­
stem capable of managing relations between diverse elements. 
Postrevolutionary elites are in the vanguard of the forces of 
change in the new nations and the kinds of wisdom they dis­
play and the decisions they make become all important.
The instability experienced by countries like Indonesia 
have led many critics to question the appropriateness of 
democracy during the early phases of independence. Some 
critics have concluded that an authoritarian regime is the
lL
only option. Their reasoning is based on what they consider 
to be the relative "inefficiency" of representative institu­
tions in solving the pressing problems facing the modernizing 
societies. They suggest a repressive system is needed to 
curb conflict between particularistic groups. A forced in­
tegration will then provide authoritarian leaders with a 
common ground for working out national issues. Hopefully, 
a foundation will be laid for future democratic institutions.
Others challenge the authoritarian solution. They 
charge the issue of national unity often is used to justify 
authoritarian leaders and practices.*^ These critics visu­
alize an essentially pluralist model of democracy and eco­
nomic development which stresses that social and cultural 
fragmentation can be overcome by the encouragement of volun­
tary assoc i at ional groups (e.g., civic clubs, political 
parties, labor unions, etc.) whose memberships cross-cut 
important cleavages (e.g., racial or ethnic). Stable demo­
cratic orders are advanced as power is increasingly dispersed 
throughout the society. Voluntary group association is re­
stricted under an authoritarian regime, where the essential
|i.
See, for instance, Robert Heilbroner, The Future as 
History (New York: Harper and Brown, Publishers, 1959) and 
Gideon Sjoberg, "Political Structure, Ideology, and Econo­
mic Development," Studies in Comparative International De­
velopment . Vol. II, no. 14 (1965), pp. 109-115.
^See Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development 
Boston: Little, Brown andCompany, 1966) and William McCord, 
The Springtime of Freedom: Evolution of Developing; Societies 
’(New York: Oxford University Press, I9S5) > especially 
chap. 10.
7ingredients, free flow of information and association, are 
limited. Liberal democratic systems, though weak, must 
therefore be maintained during the initial post-indepen­
dence period.^
One of the first and simplest pluralist assumptions is 
that democratic polities face grave obstacles in plural so­
cieties where there are discernible racial, cultural, and 
religious differences. Homogeneity makes the necessary 
consensus easier to attain, whereas cleavages tend to divide
men into separate camps. It is only a short step from "sepa*
7
ration to opposition." On the other hand, there is general 
agreement regarding the benefits of diversity among the pro­
ponents of liberal democracy. Social heterogeneity and 
dissension may endanger the stable democratic order, but 
Reinhard Bendix writes, "too much agreement is a hazard as
o
well." Thus, a democratic polity which provides stability
The term "pluralism" has many meanings. The study dis 
tinguishes between the "cultural pluralism" exhibited by 
plural societies and the "political" pluralist theory which 
is concerned with the distribution of political power. For 
a cogent discussion of the various meanings of pluralism, 
see Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1968), pp. 1-15. On the re­
lations between cross-cutting groups and the democratic 
order, see Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social 
Bases of Politics (Garden City: Doubleday, I960), pp. 88-89. 
For specific reference to developing nations, see Immanuel 
Wallerstein, The Road to Independence: Ghana and the Ivory 
Coast (New York: Humanities Press, 1964), Part II.
"^ Leslie Lipson, The Democratic Civilization (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 120.
®Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship: 
Studies of Our Changing Social Order (New York: John Wiley, 
1964), p. 22.
8and individual freedom must have both a minimum of social 
homogeneity and a minimum of heterogeneity. In any case, 
the benefits of social diversity depend on the existence of 
a fundamental consensus. The eloquent spokesman of liberal 
democracy, John Stuart Mill, writes that conflicting in­
terests must not affect the “fundamental principles of the
o
system of social union which happens to exist.uy
A second pluralist assumption, as stated previously, 
attaches great significance to the existence of secondary 
or voluntary groups. Alexis de Tocqueville argues that se­
condary groups perform two vital functions in a democracy. 
Firstly, they encourage the dispersion of power and provide 
a check on excessive government control. Secondly, they 
bridge significant social and cultural cleavages which tend 
to atomize the society into alien camps or groups.'3'0 Po­
litical ."pluralism” is thus measured by the number of associ­
ations and the incidence of individual affiliation, writes 
William Komhauser.^ There is, however, some controversy 
over the degree of "pluralism” required to maintain democracy. 
The requirements of both individual freedom and national
9john Stuart Mill, "Coleridge," in F. R. Leavis, ed.,
Mill on Bentham and Coleridge (London: Chatto and Windus, 
1962), p. 123.
^Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in Americar esp.
Book 4, Chap. 7.
^William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society 
(New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 79-bl.
9political integration must be taken into account, Seymour
Lipset states:
The available evidence suggests that the chances 
for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent 
that groups and individuals have a number of 
cross-cutting, politically relevant affiliations.
To the degree that a significant proportion of 
the population is pulled among conflicting forces, 
its members have an interest in reducing the in­
tensity of political conflict.
Mutually-reinforcing cleavages between racial, ethnic, reli­
gious, and territorial groups, however, have the opposite 
effect in the case of the plural nations where they are not 
bridged by "politically relvant affiliations."
Cross-cutting groups are also endorsed in the writing 
of conflict theorists like Lewis A. Coser who concludes that 
the "multiple group affiliations of individuals make for a 
multiplicity of conflicts criss-crossing society. Such seg­
mental participation, then, can result in a kind of balancing 
mechanism, preventing deep cleavages along one a x i s . A l ­
though structural-functionalists operate on the basis of assump­
tions that are radically different from those of conflict 
theory, many have stressed the importance of cross-cutting 
cleavages. Talcott Parsons, for instance, notes the strong 
relationships between party choice and various social groups 
to which the voter belongs, but also emphasizes that these 
are not rigid and do not coincide - providing an important
12Seymour Martin Lipset, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
^Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict 
(Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1956), pp. 78-79.
10
protection against the conflict potential of cleavage. To
an important degree, therefore, "the structural ties that
bind them together on nonpolitical bases cut across their
14political allegiances . " Gabriel A. Almond addresses him­
self specifically to countries who have what he refers to 
as fragmented political systems with deep internal divisions. 
He sees a need for "broadly aggregative1 parties and identi­
fies mutually-reinforcing cleavages with political insta­
bility.^
It is apparent from a perusal of political writings 
that the culturally plural developing societies, with dis­
tinct, self-contained, "inclusive" groups, present serious 
problems for the development and maintenance of viable sy­
stems of liberal democracy. There is the special problem 
of sharply defined "political cultures" with separate systems 
of roles with regard to churches, schools, trade unions, 
parties, the press, etc. Political culture refers to the 
attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments that "give order and 
meaning to a political process and that provide the under­
lying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the po­
litical s y s t e m . I n  the developing societies, there is
^Talcott Parsons, "Voting and the Equilibrium of the 
American Political System," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur 
Brodbeck, eds., American Voting: Behavior (Glencoe: The Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 102.
■^Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional 
Approach to Comparative Politics," in Almond and Coleman, 
eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas, pp. 3-64.
16Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 104.
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great confusion among the people because they do not share 
common orientations toward political action. The fragmen­
tation is a reflection of cleavages between the indigenous 
political cultures which may have been included within the 
boundaries of the larger territorial political system.
The conflicting views of the authoritarian proponents 
and the pluralist democracy advocates demonstrate the con­
fusion among social scientists regarding the best possible 
course of action for these fragmented societies. If moderni­
zation goals are to be achieved, political integration and 
some degree of stability must be accomplished. The central 
question resolves itself to a matter of what kind of govern­
ment structure is better able to deal with national disunity 
and other serious issues of modernization.
The principal method of analysis in current studies of 
plural societies who have failed to sustain democratic regimes 
tends to assume that merely the presence of different groups 
with varying patterns of sociocultural integration inevitably 
leads to conflict and instability, with the resulting imposi­
tion of an authoritarian regime* Our analysis attempts to 
show the depth of the cultural and social crisis that accom­
panies nation-building, the difficulty people have in relating 
to the new goals of national integration and development, as 
well as the sluggishness of the process. As a consequence, 
the political system is forced to readjust itself if it is 
to be maintained. When political leaders fail to respond to 
the call for readjustment, the breakdown of the system becomes 
almost inevitable. In the case of Indonesia, open rebellion
12
ensued and an authoritarian regime was substituted for the pari
lamentary system during the period of instability. The present
study, however, does not take the position that authoritarian
regimes are inevitable. Deep, mutually-reinforcing cleavages*
do not form insurmountable obstacles to viable and stable demo­
cracies, those democratic systems where output matches demand. 
The crucial factor, from the author's point of view, is the 
quality of leadership. The kinds of accomodation that are 
possible under an effective and committed leadership are pro­
mising even where structural conditions seem unpromising. 
Leaders must exhibit both the willingness and the capability 
of resolving tensions between structural elements. There must 
be a clear recognition by the elite of the ever-presence of 
disintegrative tendencies, especially in the absence of cross­
cutting associational groups. They shoulfi, therefore, provide
17what Stanley Hothman calls " prudent leadership.1 1 They must, 
in their prudence, be able to see more clearly and realisti­
cally than others in the society. Political systems do not 
operate in a vacuum. They are located in an environment or 
setting and leaders must be attuned to social, political, and 
economic realities. In addition, there must be a widely-held 
attitude among the leaders that the political system is appro­
priate and worth maintaining and the ability to turn this 
commitment into practical results.
■^Stanley Rothman, "A Systematic Political Theory: Obser­
vations on the Group Approach," American Political Science 
Review. Vol. 54, no. 1 (March, I960), esp. pp. 21-25. —
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Since political leaders play a central role in the control 
and resolution of political crises in the developing areas, it 
is essential, as stated previously, to examine their orienta­
tions and activities in relation to the goals of national unity 
and development. As political dissatisfaction and social unrest 
arise, what course of action is pursued? If we examine the de­
cisions that are being made, a far more complete picture of 
how and why political democracies fail can be achieved. Indo­
nesian leaders often manipulated rather than controlled the 
forces of disunity between regions. Various studies of the 
developing areas show that this has happened time and time again. 
This study therefore proposes that the question of whether the 
people of a nation are "ready" for a political democracy is not 
meaningful unless the values and activities of political leaders 
and organizations are directly linked to the failures or 
successes of the new regime. Many Indonesian leaders were not 
firmly convinced of the desirability of preserving the new 
system. Some preferred alternative systems. In the end, the 
latter group won out and the democratic order was abandoned
It is true that political democracy was put to a supreme 
test in Indonesia with its very serious problems of regional 
conflict and the extreme poverty and illiteracy which gripped 
the majority of the population. The survival of the new system 
depended on the very slim margin between the rising expecta­
tions of the people and the bleak reality of performance of 
the post-independence political regime. There was widespread 
belief that greater economic growth and personal freedom would be
accomplished through independence• New political forces and 
issues were unleased when these things failed to materialize, 
Indonesian leaders, however, were unable to respond adequately 
to the challenge. They began to ideologize instead of taking 
care of the affairs of government in a pragmatic manner. For 
example, leaders and parties neglected important economic issues 
and preferred to wage political campaigns around the Islamic 
versus secular state cleavage, an issue that tended to exacer­
bate regional conflict. Enticed by the power vacuum left with 
the demise of the colonial system, they encouraged separatist 
feelings in order to gain political power and leverage. In 
so doing, they neglected to provide effective and meaningful 
government, the major responsibility of a political leadership. 
To accomplish this, there must exist in the elite a "better
conception than the rank and file of what political and
l ft *social realities permit." The competition between politi­
cians and the multi-party system did not function in terms 
of meeting the demands of a diverse population. The result 
was political immobilism, and, eventually open revolt.
Two important problems face Indonesia and other develop­
ing plural societies. If they are not solved, the moderniza­
tion process is threatened as well as territorial integrity 
itself. The first is a need to build a national identity in 
a territory which may include many unintegrated minorities.
Deep cleavages divide groups who may have no relations with
18Stanley Rothman, op. cit.. pp. 21-25.
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each other except in the economic sphere. Remote tribal groups 
may not even know of the existence of a nation. The racial and 
cultural divisions are further complicated by the rural-urban 
cleavage. The peasantry clings to traditional life at the same 
time urban innovators are introducing modem-world culture in­
stitutions such as representative government and an industrialized 
economy. But the peoples of the developing world need more than 
a national identity. They require concrete proof that their 
nationalist movements have been successful in the form of ex­
panding incomes and rising social statuses.
These two problems eventually fuse into one fundamental 
issue - how to link the requirements for national integration 
and development to the deeper cultural values and attitudes 
of the nation as a whole. Skillful leaders are necessary if 
this fundamental problem is to be resolved. Two kinds of po­
litical .skills must be present. Eutiding a national identity 
out of .unintegrated minorities requires an elite able to de­
velop and work with symbols, images, myths, and in the modern 
sense of the term, an ideological system. They must be able 
to develop and handle the emotive elements that go into the 
construction of a sense of national identity and loyalty. 
Uncommitted pockets, not integrated into the new whole society, 
weaken its potential. Post-independence politics, however, 
requires more than an ability to manipulate imagery and emo­
tion. The ideological search for identity must be accompanied 
by a more substantive and disciplined course of action in 
relation to economic and social modernization. Politicians
16
must be able to effectively perform the various technical 
roles essential in building a modern nation-state* It would 
appear that those leaders most capable in the latter seem to 
have little charisma or emotive appeal. In the case of In­
donesia, a fragmentation of the elite occurred on the basis 
of these two skills. A developing nation requires both types, 
but one often advances at the expense of the other. What 
appears to be lacking is an accommodation process that will 
allow both groups to work together under the same regime, a 
cross-cutting of skills. Some Indonesian leaders, however, 
are held back by what is often referred to as a "zero-sum” 
conception of political power, i.e., "if the other man or 
party has power, I don't have it." It reflects a lack of 
consensus among the elite regarding the nature of politics, 
what its functions are, and what it can and can not achieve. 
Our study therefore concludes that Indonesia needed, during 
the years of the study, a leadership that was less ideologi­
cally inclined, more pragmatic and realistic, and more inter­
ested in doing a job and doing it well, albeit no less nation­
alistic.
Some Theoretical Considerations
The underlying assumption of the study is that political 
process and instability in the new plural societies are better 
understood if analyzed in relation to both the structural con­
ditions of pluralism and the response made to these conditions 
by political leaders and/or organizations. Although external
17
forces also have great influence on what happens within a so- 
siety, the limited nature of the study does not permit a 
lengthy discussion of these in relation to Indonesia.
The assumption is thus made that a sound analysis can not 
give either pluralism or the response made to it by political 
leaders and their organizations independent explanatory power. 
Many studies unavoidably do this, however, when political in­
stability is 1 explained" by reference to societal conditions 
based on race, religion, or ethnicity. For example, political 
unrest is explained by the presence of particularistic groups. 
This type of reasoning is often little more than "after-the-fact" 
reasoning. It does not tell us how conflict arises between 
groups or units.
Social scientists have been attempting to overcome some 
of the deficiencies of leaning too heavily on a strictly 
structural approach which emphasizes the ways in which in­
stitutions are interrelated and concentrates on the major 
groups themselves and on the institutions. Unfortunately, 
this approach often loses sight of everyday activities on 
an individual level. Amitai Etzioni touches on the central 
problem when he asks: "Under what conditions are societal 
processes more guided by the participants as against the
19conditions under which they are more or less •ongoing1?" 7
In other words, a plural society has within its social
19^Amitai Etzioni, "Toward a Theory of Societal Guidance,"
The American Journal of Sociology. LXXIII, 2 (September,
1967), p. 173.
18
system a capacity for conflict, but the important question 
involves how that capacity is activated. The deep structural 
cleavages within a .culturally plural society create a continu­
ous problem of tension and conflict management between cultural-
20ly differentiated groups. The management is essentially 
a political problem for it is the function of a soeiety*s po­
litical system to integrate the different elements. The 
dimensions of pluralism will of course vary from society to 
society and these variations will necessitate different kinds 
of tension management.
Leo Despres, in a study on pluralism and nationalist po­
litics in British Guiana, states that pluralism may or may
21not produce conflict on the societal level. Whether this 
occurs is often dependent on how the existing relations be­
tween societal units are politically manipulated by competing 
individuals and/or groups. The emphasis is on "organizational 
strategies" that are used to make cultural sections "politi­
cally functional." Strategies may be functional for certain 
leaders and organizations, but dysfunctional for the society 
as a whole. Violent conflict between groups is dependent, 
writes Despres, on the political mobilization of the groups
20See Alvin W. Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy in 
Functional Theory," in Llewellyn Gross, ed., Symposium on 
Sociological Theory (Evanston: Rown, Peterson & Company,
1959), pp. 241-2707
2-*-Leo a. Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist 
Politics in British Guiana-'(Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 
1967), esp. Chap. 1.
"by leaders. The-mobilization car have the goal of* tension 
reduction rather than increase. One must therefore examine 
closely the 1 organizational strategies'* employed in the 
plural societies.
The theoretical framework becomes more apparent if some 
important concepts are clarified. Fundamental to the study 
are the concepts of nation-state, nationalism, modernization, 
and plural so c iety.
The idea that the world should be organized on the basis 
of separate, sovereign nation-states originated in Europe.
It referred to the ability of a government to effectively 
set the course of action for the entire society over which 
it ruled. This quality is often absent in the nations of 
the developing world and it is essential that there be some 
revision of the concept. Although borrowed from the Western 
world, it displays a variety of natures and aims in countries 
like Indonesia. For example, the idea of the nation held by 
the urban middle class may be quite different from that of 
the agrarian masses. Yet, if a true nation-state is to evolve, 
there must be some basis of unity which bridges the various 
cleavages. In some of the new nations, this unity is often 
little more than a show of emotional appeal or a slogan and 
the concept of political and legal citizenship is missing al­
together. An important function of leaders is the encourage­
ment of a dispersal of loyalties from the small, inclusive 
group to the larger national community. Increased voluntary 
participation will help, however, traditional structures must
20
not be destroyed until new ones have sufficiently crystal­
lized.
The nationalism that is a part of the new states of 
Asia and Africa is another concept that needs clarifica­
tion. It can not be understood apart from the great 
European colonial powers of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. These empires were developed to 
answer the needs of modern Western capitalism and industry. 
They were based on a system of relationships which bound 
the economic activities of the colonies to the interests 
of the colonial powers. The colonies provided a source 
of raw materials as well as a market for European goods. 
Political domination helped the Western world to prosper, 
while the colonized peoples were often confined to primi­
tive standards of living, though economic improvement was 
as much .the case as the reverse.
The twentieth century nationalist movements arose as
a result of the inherent inequality of colonialism. "The
colonial system bred its own opposition," writes Immanuel 
22Wallerstein. He further notes that nationalism requires 
"champions" to politically activate the masses with ideas 
of freedom and independence, ideas that are initially 
gleaned from the colonial system itself. In other words, 
the colonial system provided the very ideologies that were 
used to decry colonization.
22 Immanuel Wallerstein, on. cit.. p. 111.
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These nationalist movements stressed political indepen­
dence, although this was not the only objective. Indepen­
dence was but a means to achieve other ends, namely a differ­
ent type of society which would permit freedom and economic 
prosperity. Indonesian independence is described by Sukarno, 
the country*s first President, as a bridge, the other side of 
which "we will be free to build a society of Indonesian 
Merdeka (Free Indonesia) which is self-reliant, strong and 
healthy, enduring and age-long.National independence, 
however, can lose its value if it fails to achieve economic 
and social goals. There are many obstacles to the pursuits 
of these aims. The colonial past left many with underdeveloped 
and unbalanced economies. More importantly, it forced upon 
them a different social structure which often deepened already 
existing cleavages between groups. The political and economic 
power of the colonial authorities served to Separate native 
and European peoples. Further compartmentalization occurred 
within the native sector as different groups responded and 
adapted as relatively insulated communities. The possibility 
of working out traditional or new hostilities was rigidly con­
trolled by the colonizers. The result was a societal structure 
which furthered the interests of the colonial power rather 
than national unity in its own terms.
Although different groups respond to the appeal to end
23
Excerpt taken from speech given by President Sukarno 
on August 1, 19^ 5.
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foreign domination, nationalist movements tend to fragment 
following independence. J. J. Furnivall writes that national­
ism in the plural societies is a "disruptive force, tending 
to shatter and not consolidate its social order." This is 
because of the absence of a "common demand" regarding de­
sirable goals. Thus, nationalism in the developing world 
shows two faces, strong integrating qualities, as well as 
tension and conflict potential.
Some questions remain. Is cultural pluralism a suffi­
cient and necessary condition of conflict and instability?
Can the forces of cultural pluralism be managed? If political 
leaders are aware of structural conditions within their socie­
ties, why do some appear to intentionally exacerbate conflict 
between groups? This study takes the position that the leader­
ship can encourage as well as discourage conflict. Specific 
incidents involving violent conflict between Indonesian 
groups will be discussed as examples of conflict potential 
activated by leaders bent on articulating the will of par­
ticularistic elements.
Another term that should be examined more closely is 
that of the “plural society." This term, as stated previously, 
was used by Furnivall to describe societal structures of co­
lonial dependencies. The term does seem particularly 
applicable to the tropical colonies of Asia and Africa where 
colonizer and colonized lived side by side, with little or
J. S. Furnivall, op. cit.. p. ^68.
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no interaction, in one political unit. The system was held 
together by the political force of one group, i.e., the 
colonial power, over the others. Furnivall observes that 
the colonizers attempt to maintain the indigenous social 
order as much as possible; however, it tends to degenerate 
as it comes into contact with the Western cultures of the 
rulers. "Its center of gravity has been displaced, it hangs 
from above instead of standing on its own base." National­
ism arises in reaction to these abonormal conditions. The 
segmented social structure, however, creates no common "social 
demand" and nationalism becomes a disruptive force, according 
to Furnivall.
While Furnivall's model appears to be adequate in describ­
ing the colonial society where force is the major agent of 
integration, it presents problems when used in the study of 
independent plural nations where force is not so apparent.
It is especially difficult to adjust to structural-functional 
analysis which emphasizes shared values and institutions. In 
dealing with this problem, Despres, in his study on British 
Guiana, revised Furnivall's model. He posits that a society 
has many different levels at which social institutions are 
structured, some of which are more interdependent than others. 
Political institutions are the most "inclusive" structures 
of a society for their function is to integrate the tdtal 
social system, i.e., lower-level structures of territory, 
kinship, and work. The forces of nationalism can thus pose
25Ibid., p. 459.
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a threat to the functional autonomy of cultural units and 
thereby aggravate the problem of tension management. Despres, 
however, concludes that political change of even this magnitude 
will not usually produce violent conflict between groups un­
less they are "politically mobilized" by leaders who see fit
2 6to exploit the tensions. For this reason, the dynamics 
of nationalist politics in British Guiana and other new plural 
nations can be most fully understood in terms of the "organi­
zational strategies" that nationalist leaders employ to make
"existing socicultural patterns functional with respect to
27the changes that are taking place."
In defining the term "plural society" Despres writes 
that two related sets of facts must be taken into account. 
First, such analysis must take into account the extent to 
which particular groups display different systems of culture 
as evidenced by the activities of members. Second, it must 
take into account the level at which social activities serve 
to maintain cultural differentiation as the basis for socio­
cultural integration. Despres found discrete collectivities 
in British Guiana which formed separate and comparatively 
different kinds of social communities. Kinship netsworks, 
patterns of economic and social mobility, and orientations 
toward authority were very different. In short, Despres 
found that there were no social structures at the communal
c Leo Despres, op. cit., p. 288. 
2?Ibid.. p. 269.
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level of sociocultural integration which served to bring 
cultural units together in the expression of a common sy­
stem of cultural values,
A plural society is thus one in which there is found 
the coexistence of several values systems likely to be held 
together by a mixture of political coercion and economic 
interdependence. The political structure of the society 
reflects the nature of relationships between constituent 
elements. Because the distribution of power follows the 
lines of social cleavage, it is concentrated in the domi­
nant group. Combined with economic interdependence, such 
power becomes an effective source of social integration.
Any change capable of altering the structure of society 
(i.e., moving from colonial dependency to independent na­
tion) carries with it the potential of stimulating forces 
of pluralism. Whether problems arise depend upon two factors, 
according to Depres: 1.) the degree to which the change
poses a threat to the functional autonomy of cultural sections 
and 2.) the extent to which organizational control is exer­
cised with respect to the introduction of change in order 
to minimize the tension it generates.
In the case of independent plural nations, one must 
assume that where there is conflict, society is being held 
together by coercion and constraint. Can conflict be replaced 
by cooperation? To accomplish this end, leaders must make a 
commitment to building up the idea of a national community 
and a common social demand that will bridge the various
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cleavages. The more homogeneous societies are different in 
that leaders must work to satisfy a common want, whereas the 
leaders of the plural societies have a more fundamental and 
immediate problem. They must first of all contend with the 
problem of integrating diverse groups and organizing a common 
social demand.
There is no doubt that Indonesia is one of the world's 
most diverse nations. There are sharp divisions between In­
donesians and small communities of Chinese, Arabs, Eurasians, 
and Europeans. The Indonesians themselves are divided into 
hundreds of traditionally self-aware ethnic groups, some of 
which have populations of over one million persons. Ethnic 
loyalties compete with the loyalties held by the state and 
national communities. Current conflict of interests have 
been aggravated by cases of traditional hostilities such 
as between the Toba Bataks and Karo Bataks of North Sumatra. 
The present study emphasizes the important cleavage between 
the ethnic Javanese, who are by far the largest single 
ethnic group, with perhaps 52 per cent of the country's 
total population, and the melange of groups who inhabit the 
outer islands. Conflict between the two regions seriously 
threatened the nation's territorial integrity during the 
course of this study. The dispute is regarded as a backdrop 
against which we observe and evaluate the national political 
leadership and organizations. The main thrust of the study 
is with the leaders and their parties and their relationships 
to the malfunctioning parliamentary system. By concentrating
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on these factors, we hope to get at the concrete reality of 
the situation. There is an attempt to construct a composite 
picture of how societal structure and political behavior in 
the developing nations act upon each other to create the on­
going political process.
Our analysis shows that the inability of the elite to 
control conflict between regions was the single most important 
factor accounting for the failure of the new system. This 
inability is attributed to divisions within the elite itself 
with regard to the system, its legitimacy and value for In­
donesia. Leaders who were committed to the new system and 
attempted to deal with unrest through controls permitted 
under constitutional law were eventually replaced by those 
who sought to take control by destroying the system itself.
A split in the national leadership broke the main integrating 
force in the new nation, a commitment by the elite to con­
stitutional democracy. The study therefore proposes:
1. The political process in the plural societies 
undergoing modernization is more clearly de­
lineated if both the conflict potential of 
pluralism and the response made to this po­
tential by political leaders and/or organiza­
tions are taken into account.
2. If a system of liberal democracy is to survive 
in these nations, there must be at least a 
narrow consensual agreement among the leaders 
with regard to commitment and loyalty to that 
type of system.
3. Effective and stable democratic orders face 
serious obstacles in the culturally plural 
societies where clearly discernible minorities 
preclude a "common social demand.” The more 
extreme the cleavages and mutual isolation, 
the greater the danger to the system.
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4. Secondary or associational groups that cross-cut 
deep structural cleavages such as race and eth­
nicity are favorable to stable and effective 
democracy.
5. An overarching cooperation at the elite level can 
be substituted for cross-cutting affiliations at 
the mass level during the initial period of self- 
rule.
6. Elite cooperation requires a "prudent leadership” 
willing to turn basic loyalty to the system into 
practical results. Moderation and accomodation 
are necessary prerequisites^.
7. As cross-cutting links are built among constituent 
elements, the elite function of basic integration 
and organization of social demands becomes less 
important and leaders can then concentrate on the 
satisfaction of these demands for the society as
a whole.
The following format is used in the study: Chapter II
deals with pertinent historical and sociocultural condition­
ing of modem Indonesia. Chapter III presents the post inde­
pendence political process with an emphasis on the internal 
dispute between regions and the response made to this dispute 
by the political elite. Chapter IV is evaluative in nature 
in that the study attempts to make some observations about 
the relationships between political instability and the 
forces of cultural pluralism found in Indonesia. Hopefully, 
our generalizations will provide some insights into the 
common problems shared by the plural nations of the developing 
world.
CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL AND SOCIOCULTURAL BACKGROUND
As a study in cultural pluralism, Indonesia presents 
itself as one of the world's most diverse nations. The land- 
mass comprises the world's largest .archipelago, a string of 
3,000 islands strewn over 3»000 miles, linking Asia to 
Australia. Geologically, Indonesia is rather young, a chain 
of smoking volcanoes reaching from the Indian Ocean to the 
Pacific. Culturally speaking, however, the islands are old 
and were the home of ancient and obscure peoples. The more 
important islands are familiar landmarks: Java, the most
highly developed and populated, Bali, Sumatra, Kalimantan 
(formerly southern Borneo), Sulawesi (formerly the Celebes), 
the Moluccas (often called the Spice Islands), and West Irian 
(western New Guinea). The total land area is 735»000 square 
miles, most of which is tropical and richly fertile. The 
vast majority of the people are farmers, with rice as the 
major crop and chief food staple. Indonesia is also richly 
endowed with natural resources such as petroleum, tin, 
nickel, and bauxite.
On these islands reside the world's fifth largest popu­
lation, over 115,000,000. There is, however, a very uneven
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distribution with over two-thirds of the population living 
on the islands of Java and Madura {which are adjacent to each 
other}.1 Java itself is one of the world1s most densely popu­
lated regions, with even some rural sections reaching 1,000
persons per square kilometer. The following figures give an
2indication of population distributions
Province
Java and Madura 
Sumatra 
Kalimantan 
Sulawesi
Bali & Nusa Tenggara
Moluccas
West Irian
Area in Sq, Km. Pop. Oct. 1961 Density
132,17  ^
473,606 
539,460 
189,035 
73,614 
74,505 
421,951
63,059,000
15,739,000
4.102.000
7.079.000
5.558.000 
790,000 
758,000
477. 0
33.0 
7.6
37.0
76.0 
11.0
1.8
The peoples of Indonesia are a melange of cultures, tra­
ditions, and languages. One recent study found 366 'slef-aware 
and self-contained ethnic groups, ten of which have populations 
over 1,000,000.^ The ethnic Javanese of East and Central Java 
constitute the largest cultural group, approximately one-half 
of the total population. Racial heritage, on the other hand, 
is fairly consistent In that most people are descendants of 
original Asian immigration. There are, however, small communi­
ties of Chinese, Arabs, Eurasians, and Europeans. The people
1MId-1969 population estimate from Data Sheets Popula­
tion Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C.
Source s Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia, 1962 
(Djakarta s Biro Psat Statistik, 1962}, pp. 11, 13.
M^. A, Jaspan, "A Provisional List of Indonesian Ethnic 
Groups,*’ Sosiografi Indonesia (Jogjakarta), Vol.l, no. 2 (1959).
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are also somewhat united by a common belief in the Islam 
religion, with over ninety per cent of the population ad­
hering to the faith. There are differences in religious 
intensity, with the more strict Moslems living in West 
Java and the outer islands. Conflict between the strict 
and nominal Moslems created problems for the post-inde­
pendence political system. The Indonesians have, as well, 
a new national language which is derived from the old 
lingua franca of the Indies, bazaar Malay. Indonesians 
have adopted this language very well, overcoming some of 
the difficulties of having hundreds of dialects. It can 
thus be said that the new nation displays both diversity 
and unity. The national motto, Unity in Diversity, echoes 
this thought.
The most fundamental split in Indonesian society se­
parates the ethnic Javanese and the island of Java from 
the melange of cultural groups on the outer islands, those 
islands extending outward from Java, the center and seat 
of government. This basic division can, in large part, be 
attributed to natural geography and technology. Irrigated 
rice fields were early used in Java with the resulting high 
density of population. The sparsely-populated outer islands 
permitted a shifting cultivation. Differences persist to 
the present. Major Indonesian cultural groups include the
h
following:
^Willem F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition 
(The Hague/Bandung: W, van Hoeve Ltd. , 195&)» P. 2jT!
Peoples and Tribes of Indonesia
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I Java and Madura
1. Javanese
2. Sundanese
3. Madurese
II Sumatra and adjacent islands
1. Achenese
2. Bataks
3. Menangkabau
4. Coastal Malays
5. Others
III Kalimantan
1. Dayaks
2. Coastal Malays, Javanese, Banjarese, Buginese
IV Sulawesi and adjacent islands
1. Macassarese and Buginese
2. Torajas
3. Menadonese, Gorontalese, Sangirese, Talaudians
4. Others
V Nusa Tenggara (Lesser Sunda Islands)
1. Balinese
2. Sasaks
3. Florinese
4. Timorese
5. Others
VI Moluccas
1. Amhonese
2. Others
VII Western New Guinea and adjacent islands
Papuans
A somewhat cursory survey of the populations of the 
major outer islands shows the following.^ The great majority 
of the people on Sumatra practice farming, using shifting 
cultivation. Additionally, there are quite a few traders.
The Islamic faith dominates on this island and it was the 
first to be Islamized. To the north of the island reside
^Most of the following information regarding cultural 
groups was taken from Wertheim, op. cit., pp. 28-37.
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the strictly Moslem Achenese. These people, having defended 
their independence against the Dutch longest of all, still 
retain a strongly developed sense of freedom, On the west 
coast of Sumatra is another population which can be-counted 
among the fervent believers of Islam, the Menangkabau. This 
population is known by its matrilinear family structure and 
by the relatively independent position of the women. Many 
Menangkabau traders and intellectuals have migrated to other 
parts of the archipelago because rigid traditionalism of 
the group is not conducive to innovation and change. Some­
what oppressed between the Achenese and the Menangkabau in 
the interior of North Sumatra are the Bataks, many of whom 
have been Christianized. Cattle-ownership plays an important 
part in several of the tribes and the kinship system is 
basically patrilinear. Along the east coast of Sumatra, 
on the smaller islands of Bangka and Billiton and scattered 
over the Riau and Lingga archipelagoes, the Islamized Malays 
in the strict sense are to be found. Southern Sumatra,too, 
is mostly inhabited by peoples related to the Malays. The 
plantation area of Sumatra's Eastcoast Residency is a typically 
immigrant area, with the population showing quite a mixed 
character. Chinese are found outside the western plantations, 
scattered along the east coast, and over the islands around 
Singapore. They are fishermen, lumbermen, miners, and farmers.
Shifting cultivation is also the dominant agricultural 
pattern in Borneo as it is nearly everywhere in the outer 
islands, although the tribes along the coast engage in commerce.
3 k
The Dayaks are found in the interior, while Malays inhabit 
the coast. Coastal residents are usually Moslem, while the 
interior Dayaks practice their traditional religious rituals 
and activities. Some have converted to Christianity. A 
great concentration of Chinese is to be found in Western 
Borneo, nearest to Singapore. Most are engaged in agricul­
ture and they play an especially important role in rubber, 
coconut and pepper cultivation.
Bali lies east of Java and like the Javanese, the Bali­
nese are mainly engaged in rice cultivation on sawahs, irri­
gated fields. They differ from the Javanese by professing 
still the Hinduist and Buddhist religions.
The population of Celebes shows a great diversity.
On the densely-populated southwestern arm are the Macassarese 
and Buginese, both thoroughly Islamized. The Buginese have 
won fame as great sailors. The Torajas live in Central 
Celebes and Protestantism has made a headway with some of 
the tribes, although they tend to be Islamic along the coast. 
The densely-populated northeastern extremity of Celebes is 
inhabited by the Menadonese, the majority of whom prefer the 
Protestant faiths. The group had for a long time supplied 
manpower for the Dutch colonial army. On the island of Ambon 
is found a large contingent of Christians, both Catholics 
and Protestants. They were, for the long years, the favored 
people of the colonial regime. They formed an intermediate 
layer of minor officials between the natives and the Europeans. 
It is understandable why the Ambonese were strongly opposed
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to the formation of an Indonesian unitary state which di­
minished Dutch influence.
Finally, there are the aborigines of Western New Guinea, 
the Papuans. These people differ markedly from the inhabi­
tants of the archipelago proper racially, culturally, and 
linguistically.
Turning to the island of Java, one also finds much 
heterogeneity. Most of the inhabitants are agriculturalists, 
but some have become wage laborers on the plantations and 
in the factories. The cities, developed communication system, 
and the rise of industry have created a greater amount of 
social differentiation than is commonly found on the outer 
islands. Many of the occupations outside agriculture, how­
ever, are performed by people of foreign origin. Much of 
the trade is in the hands of people of Chinese ancestry.
Most of.Western Java is inhabited by the Sundanese. The 
Bantamese to the extreme West are more akin to the Javanese 
proper, as are the inhabitants of Cheribon and surrounding 
areas. The city of Djakarta (largest city and capital) con­
tains a melange of peoples, including Chinese and Europeans.
The ethnic Javanese are found mainly in Central and East Java. 
Also in East Java are found a very high number of Madurese, 
who have immigrated from the infertile island of Madura.
The Sundanese and Madurese are generally known to be faithful 
observers of the Islamic faith and it is not by chance that 
these peoples were involved in the Darul Islam extremist 
movement which tried to establish an Islamic state by violence.
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The Javanese proper# especially in Central Java# profess the 
Islamic religion, hut are generally less strict in the obser­
vance of their religious duties.
Historical Background
Little is known about early Indonesia, but it has been 
established that people were living and using stone tools in 
Java at least 3,000 years ago. It is believed they originally 
came from Southwest China. In the fifth century, B.C. more 
people came to the islands, probably from India. By the 
first century A.D. a highly developed trade existed with the 
mainland of Asia. Hindu and Chinese traders settled in Java, 
Sumatra, and Kalimantan. From the fifth century A.D. onward, 
for many hundreds of years, Hindu and Buddhist and Hindu- 
Buddhist kingdoms flourished and fell among themselves. 
Crumbling temples, such as Prambanan and Boroburdur, are the 
last vestiges of that civilization. These Hindu settlers and 
traders introduced their culture:and religion, but historians 
believe this influence touched only the top layer of the 
indigenous society and was mainly confined to Javanese court 
circles.^
^For historical background, see D.G.E. Hall, A History 
of Southeast Asia (New York; St. Martin's Press, 1955)1 
Bernard Vlekke, Nusantara: A History of Indonesia (The Hague: 
W. van Hoeve, Ltd,, 195971 J.C, VanLeur, Indonesian Trade and 
Society; Essays in Asian Social and Economic History, Selected 
Studies on Indonesia by Dutch Scholars, Vol. I (The Hague;
W. van Hoeve, Ltd., 1955)*
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In the thirteenth century an influx of Islam began.
This influx eventually brought the last great Hindu empires 
to an end/. In contrast to Hinduism, Islam influence pene­
trated all layers of society. Nonetheless, this penetration 
proved to be far deeper on the outer islands, and, to the 
present time, Islamic beliefs are stronger in these areas.
The Dutch came in the late sixteenth century, at once 
conceiving the islands as the Netherlands East India, the 
territory*s formal designation until independence in 19^ 9. 
They fought off the Portuguese, Spanish, and English and 
subsequently ruled for three centuries until the Japanese 
invasion of 19^ 2. In 19^5, following the end of World War 
II, the Indonesians began to resist the return of the colo­
nizers. After four years of revolutionary war, Indonesia 
was granted her sovereignty in December, 19^ 9.
Sociocultural Background
Since the entire Southeast Asia region has been exposed 
to much external influence, it is difficult, as Lucian Pye 
notes, to settle on what should be taken as the indigenous 
cultures. A popular Indonesian saying is that one never 
knows what will wash up upon the shores of the islands.
This is not to say that each new cultural penetration re­
placed the prevailing cultures, but merely that the present
^Lucian W. Pye, "The Politics of Southeast Asia," in 
Almond and Coleman, eds., op. cit., p. 69.
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cultures are a blend of both indigenous and exported patterns.
Two types of state structures appear to have existed in 
8early Indonesia. They were the product of geographical* 
cultural, and historical conditions. These differences con­
tinue to persist and are reflected in the contemporary Java- 
outer islands cleavage. The first type was the bureaucratic- 
inland states found mainly in Java. These states were made 
possible through irrigated cultivation of rice which supported 
dense populations. Surpluses were available to maintain a 
nobility who lived in kratons (court cities). The revered city 
of Jogjakarta on the island of Java is a former court city.
The second type of structure was the harbor principalities 
located along the coastal regions of the exporting outer is­
lands. The nobility in these kingdoms depended on foreign 
trade and exerted little direct control over the sparsely- 
populated hinterlands, where people practiced "dry" or 
shifting agriculture (using a slash and burn method).
The irrigated and shifting cultivation regions present 
two distinct types of civilization under which traditional 
cultures may be subsumed. In Java, where the dominant eco­
nomic pattern was wet rice production, the villagers were 
territorially organized under the bureaucratic kingdoms.
The sparsely-populated regions of the outer islands were 
organized geneologically around non-sedentary cultivation.
®These two structures were discussed by Willem F.
Wertheim, op. cit., p. 52 and J.C. Van Leur, op. cit,, 
p. 104.
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Both systems, however, shared certain common characteris­
tics of social life. They were both for the most part organized 
around the land and its use along traditional lines. The vast 
majority of people lived in small peasant villages based on 
closed, self-sufficient, and relatively unproductive economic 
systems. The general peasant patterns cited by Robert Red- 
field are typical of Indonesian traditional life which was 
maintained through a heavy dependence on Adat or customary 
law. z
Traditional society was also organized around two ancient 
principles that exist to the present in modified form: Gotong 
Rojong, the principle of mutual assistance, and Musjawarah, 
the village decision-making process involving deliberation 
and compromise. Gb^ tong Rojong thrived in the traditional 
villages, particularly in Java, where land was held in common 
by the villagers, but cultivated by individual families. It 
was, in its traditional form, a system in which things were 
done by the whole community for the whole community. Assis­
tance was given in all activities the individual was not able 
to perform himself. If you are hungry, you are never hungrier 
than your neighbors, so long as there is food in the village. 
Gotong Rojong has weathered innumerable crises for the vill­
agers and has nutured a communal type of life that is still 
strong in many rural areas. Mus.jawarah refers to the tradition
^Robert Redfield, Peasant Society and Culture (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1956).
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of discussion. Indonesians will sit and talk indefinitely, 
attempting to solve problems by patient consideration of 
all points of view. Unanimous agreement is sought and de­
cisions will be postponed many times until it is achieved.
In the traditional sense, Musjawarah is not a simple majority 
vote, but a compromise of all viewpoints discussed. To 
the present, Indonesians find it difficult to accept the 
concept of majority rule in government. It is significant 
that both Gotong Rojong and Musjawarah were used by political 
leaders as symbols to invoke emotional responses from the 
masses.
The traditional social structure consisted of two 
distinct strata, the peasantry and a small ruling elite.
A wide gulf divided the two groups, although they were joined 
through a common belief system which emphasized the elite’s 
sacral power. The elite was thus able to legitimize itself 
through its monopoly of this power. Absolute control was 
impossible, however, because the peasantry controlled ma­
terial resources, namely the food supply.Within each of 
the two strata there was little functional differentiation 
and status was for the most part ascriptive. One’s birth 
rather than what one accomplished made the difference. 
Conflict was avoided by submitting to people higher than 
oneself and the domination of those who were considered in­
ferior. It is significant the traditional nobility never
^Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoei The 
Free Press of Glencoe, i960), p. 9.
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became a landed gentry in the sense of the Western term.
It was probably because of the elite*s sacral importance 
which encouraged their segregation from the general popula­
tion. The shifting agriculture of the outer islands also 
precluded this possibility.
A social organization thus evolved in which the peasan­
try and elite were effectively screened from each other and 
yet at the same time remained very dependent on one another. 
The "screen" or division allowed each to follow its own tra­
dition and yet at the same time maintain respect for the 
other. ^  A wide social gulf thus divided the noble families 
from the common man, both in the inland-states and coastal 
principalities. Although village communities were bound to­
gether by princely authority, they were pretty much left to 
themselves. As a rule, the position of chief in the rural 
villages was not one of authoritarian command in that im­
portant decisions were not made by a single leader, but by 
a council of elders. For this reason, there is a certain 
amount of democracy inherent in the primitive Indonesian 
social structure.
In summary, the basic themes of modern Indonesian cul­
ture are a blend of both indigenous and borrowed patterns. 
The more important aspects of the culture seem to have 
originated with the traditional peasantry rather than the
*^I am indebted to Miss Carol E. Ballingall for this 
point.
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nobility. The point is proved, observes Willem F. Wertheim,
noted Dutch tropical sociologist, by the fact that peasant
life changed very little, although radical changes occurred
within the ruling dynasties. The imperial superstructures
of traditional society were only "loosely-built edifices on
12a solid base of peasant life." Out of peasant life came 
the principles of mutual aid and group decision-making, two 
patterns that favored a primitive form of communism in the 
traditional society, with a basic difference provided by 
the sawah (wet) and ladang (dry) cultivation regions. These 
differences were further compounded by the uneven penetra­
tion of Islam after the thirteenth century A.D.
The Impact of Western Colonial Rule
The Dutch first arrived in the islands in 1596. They
slowly consolidated their power throughout a good portion of
the archipelago and remained in firm control until 1942, the
13first year of Japanese occupation. ^
Control was in the hands of the United East India Com­
pany during the first two hundred years of colonial rule.
The major goal of the Company was to obtain greater profits 
by monopolizing trade. The Company was not especially interested 
in direct political control and achieved its objectives by
12v/ertheimf op. cit. , p. 6.
-^For authoritative history of the colonial period, see 
Furnivall, op. cit.
3^working out trade agreements with the nobility. Eventually, 
however, the Company intervened in indigenous political 
affairs in order to protect its trade privileges.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the 
"culture system" was introduced whereby village lands were 
used for the cultivation of export crops designated by 
colonial authorities. Basically, the system consisted of 
leasing large amounts of land from the native overlords 
(previously the Dutch had purchased products directly from 
the nobility). This of course presented the problem of 
taking land use away from the peasants. The colonial au­
thorities instituted regulations whereby land would be used 
by the Dutch and the peasants during alternate periods. The 
rental income for the land was paid to the overlord, who, in 
turn, was supposed to pay a portion of it to the peasants to 
compensate for the time they could not grow rice. A good 
many of the peasants were also employed directly by the 
large estate companies as field workers and factory pro­
cessing hands. Eventually, a portion of the peasantry found 
itself relying on a money economy instead of the traditional 
barter-type system. Under the barter system the exchange of 
products and labor was carried on within the village, large­
ly on a communal, traditional, and non-commercial basis. By 
employing Indonesian labor, the colonial regime caused 
money to circulate, in the form of wages, among the popula­
tion. Yet, the Javanese, in particular, persisted in a 
desire to maintain ties with their own land. The result
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was that the ordinary peasant provided for his own needs and 
worked for wages only when he was forced. For the time being 
at least money wages were too great a departure from the 
agrarian tradition. The average peasant tried to keep to a 
minimum the periods when he was employed by a Western-owned 
undertaking. He preferred to leave profit-seeking to the 
Chinese and Arabs who were more at home in the cash currency 
system. In time, most of the small business ventures were 
owned and operated by outsiders and there was little develop­
ment of a native Indonesian business class. This tendency 
persists to the present.
The estate system's constant need for increased acreage
has been seen by many as a contributing factor to Java's
contemporary overpopulation problem. The increased estate
acreage, along with Java's intensified form of agriculture,
undoubtedly encouraged high birth rates. The estate system
reached its peak during the first and second decades of the
twentieth century and served to bring great wealth into
the cofers of the Netherlands treasury. Sugar estates were
most successful and the sugar industry was considered to be
the "life belt" of the homeland. The production of 179 sugar
plantations and seventeen sugar refineries in Java contributed
twelve to fifteen per cent of the total income for the Nether-
14lands during 1920. With a large part of the archipelago's
l^Selosoemardjan, Social Change in Jogjakarta (Ithacaj 
Cornell University Press’^ 19^2), pi 156.
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profits flowing out of the country, it was impossible to in­
crease native capital. The Dutch also found it necessary to 
strengthen the power of the native aristocracy in order to 
gain greater crop levies and land use. The period has right­
fully been called the classic example of foreign domination 
disrupting indigenous cultural patterns.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the Dutch 
attempted to correct some of the abuses of the culture system 
by opening the Indies to private enterprise. It was hoped 
this would encourage native capital and thus raise living 
standards for the indigenous peoples. The new policy served 
only to generate a heavy influx of European immigration, but 
it failed to appreciably raise native living conditions.
The turn of the .twentieth century witnessed a concerted 
effort by the Dutch to improve native health and welfare 
through direct government programs. Western education was 
extended to the native population for the first time. Ironi­
cally, this period coincides with the birth of the organized 
phase of Indonesian nationalism.
In general, the last hundred years of colonial rule proved 
to be the most disruptive to traditional society. The spread 
of Western political and economic institutions were particu­
larly detrimental to indigenous social organization. The 
very base of traditional society, the village social structure, 
was gradually eroded by increasing Dutch influence. Although 
the Dutch attempted to keep traditional structures intact, their 
primary concern was at all times on their own economic interests.
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It was during these latter years that the Dutch began 
to intensify the already traditional differences between 
Java and the outer islands. Prior to the late nineteenth 
centuryf the Dutch had not penetrated very deeply into the 
outer region. They were mainly concerned with market crops 
grown on Javanese estates. The Javanese nobility had been 
incorporated into the colonial authority system and therefore 
became identified with colonial exploitation. On the other 
hand, the outer islands were left pretty much as they were. 
Toward the turn of the century, however, industrial expansion 
in Europe created the demand for new raw materials. Immediate­
ly, the Dutch turned their attention to the outer islands where 
most of Indonesia's mineral and petroleum resources are found. 
Things were different on these islands where the sparse popu­
lation and abundant land provided for greater economic oppor­
tunity and independence. Many peasants began to cultivate 
rubber, coconut, and tobacco for export. Others worked for 
Dutch mining enterprises. Individual enterprise was fur­
thered by the presence of strong Moslem beliefs which pro­
mote successful business and work achievements. Although 
the Dutch attempted to economically exploit parts of these 
islands, especially Sumatra and Borneo, they were unable to 
bring the shifting populations in most sections under the 
effective political control of the central government.
Thus, a certain amount of economic and political inde­
pendence was possible on the outer islands under a system 
of indirect colonial administration. Conversely, this was
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impossible on Java where land was scarce and Dutch rule ri­
gidly imposed.
All in all, traditional differences between the two 
regions were increased during this period and persisted to 
plague the post-independence central government. The ex­
porting outer region fear domination by the numerically 
superior, important island of Java. On the other hand, the 
peoples of the outer islands have traditionally viewed the 
Javanese culture as more developed and complex than their 
own and the Javanese are thought of as very clever and re­
fined. So, although other ethnic groups feared Javanese 
domination, they, at the same time, wished in many ways to 
emulate them in a love-hate relationship./**-*
16The Indonesian Nationalist Movement
By the early part of the twentieth century, power had 
become increasingly centered in the large-scale estates and 
mining companies belonging to Europeans. Indonesians con­
tinued to supply raw materials without the benefit of native
industrialization. The whole system as Werthem states, was
17based on abundance of cheap manual labor. 1 The general
I*;-'Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: 
Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 (Ithaca: Cornell Modem 
Indonesian Project Monograph Series, 1966), p. 4.
16
For a complete history of the nationalist movement 
and the years of war and revolution, see George McTuman 
Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Pre s s, 1952).
"^Wertheim, op. cit., p. 101.
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living standards of the masses remained low despite Dutch 
social welfare programs. For the first time, the turn of 
the century witnessed a small group of Indonesians openly 
agitating for Indonesian nationalism. Initially, the trend 
followed the course of a "cultural revolution," a return to 
traditional life. There was little emphasis on political 
independence. The movement soon gained momentum, however, 
and began to articulate a desire for national self-determi­
nation. Thereafter, the years prior to the Second World 
War witnessed repeated Dutch attempts to fight off the effects 
of these nationalist sentiments.
The Dutch were largely successful in their efforts to 
create barriers between potential mass leaders and the 
peasantry. Their major weapon was the exiling of leaders 
and the disbanding of their organizations. Colonial rela­
tionships were such that the masses were unable, without an 
active native political elite, to understand the connection 
between their deteriorating status and the Dutch colonial
1 o
regime. It was during the two or three decades prior to 
the Second World War that the peasantry became more cognizant 
of Dutch domination and exploitation. A great deal of 
"structural resentment" between Indonesians and Dutch began 
to accumulate as Indonesians became more and more aware of 
the economic and racial inequality which supported the co­
lonial system.
1 8Kahin, op. cit., p. 41.
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As previously stated, the spread of* Indonesian national­
ism corresponds to the spread of Western education among the 
native population. The Dutch, however, needed Westem-edu- 
cated civil servants for their “bureaucratic machinery. They 
were also interested, at this time, in checking the threat 
of the Pan Islamic movement which was gaining strength , at 
the turn of the century. The end result was that the spread 
of Western education gradually worked to produce a group of 
university-trained native leaders who proved to be the major 
promoters of Indonesian nationalism.
These young leaders were mainly from the lower rungs 
of the native aristocracy. They were not, however, members 
of the traditional elite (for the most part), but acquired 
their prestige through education and occupation. For ex­
ample, Sukarno,the leading nationalist figure, was educated 
as a civil engineer at the Bandung Technical College. Dur­
ing his student days he helped to found the Indonesian Na­
tionalist Party. Leaders like Sukarno were embued with an 
active sense of Western liberal democracy and yet were con­
fined to a society where racial discrimination existed at 
every turn. They believed they could do as well as the 
Dutch in government and economic affairs, but were denied 
the opportunity to do so in their own country by foreigners 
who had no right to be there. There did not exist in pre­
revolutionary Indonesia any social situation in which an 
Indonesian was allowed to have economic, social, or political 
control over white Europeans. One has only to look at
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photographs of the turn of the century to glimpse the feeling 
of deference the Indonesian assumed toward his Dutch master.
In none of these, were Indonesians permitted to sit while 
Dutch stood. Moreover, the Dutch pursued a luxurious life 
style analogous to that of rich plantation owners of the 
American South. This must have been extremely frustrating 
and it is understandable why many of the young Indonesians 
became part of the embryonic nationalist movement.
Prior to the Second World War the growth of the movement 
was opposed by almost complete Dutch monopolization of the 
strategic instruments of power, i.e., money, weapons, ideas, 
land, etc. If we place the: movement in the context of the 
prewar political situation, it is easy to see why even under­
ground organizations were impossible under the repressive co­
lonial regime. In its early stages, the movement was really 
nothing more than a loose, shifting association of small 
groups. As a result, there was little development of cen­
tralism and strong leaders operating from a single center 
of decision-making. Divisiveness was constantly articulated 
with much ideological conflict over Communism and Islam, as 
well as disagreement regarding strategy and tactics concerning 
cooperation or non-cooperation with the colonial authorities.
The years preceding the Second World War saw continual 
efforts to overcome the divisions, but they were largely un­
successful. Herbert Feith writes that the story of the pre­
revolutionary movement was one of repeated splits. In the 
absence of a mass organization, leaders tended to regroup
51
themselves in "ever narrowerer clique-like formations in
which relationships of trust and authority were sustained
19by face to face contact." This was caused by the frequent 
failings and exilings of leaders, the lack of a central or­
ganization for the resolution of problems such as existed 
with the Indian Congress or Philippine Nationalist parties, 
and the fact that nationalist organizations did not have a
role in the existing political system and therefore lacked
20"rewards” to distribute. The Dutch were thus able to 
effectively keep the movement in check until the Japanese 
interregnum.
In 19^2 the Japanese invaded the islands and within a
21few days the Dutch had surrendered. The weak, half-hearted 
defense by the Dutch made a tremendous impression on the 
? Indonesian people. The surrender, despite the large number 
of allied troops present, served to spread the conviction 
that the Dutch lacked courage, Dutch prestige sank to a 
new low and many people were convinced, if given arms, they 
could have done as well as the Japanese in defeating the 
Dutch. It soon became clear, as one Indonesian put it, that 
the white tuan (master) was no more than a sudara (brother).
-^Herbert Feith, op. cit., p. 21.
20lbid., p. 21.
21For information about the Japanese interregnum, see 
Henry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague:
W. van Hoeve, Ltd. , 195#")' and also George M. Kahin, op. cit.
Sjahrir, an Indonesian socialist, observed that when 
the Japanese attack finally came, the overwhelming majority 
of the native people, including the educated, welcomed it 
because they were convinced that conditions under the Japanese 
would be better or that things probably would be no worse. 
Things did get better initially. Almost immediately, the 
Japanese spurred a rapid rise in socioeconomic status for 
a number of Indonesians by filling important government posts 
with native people. People were embued with confidence as 
they discovered they could successfully fill some of the 
formerly Dutch-held positions.
The immediate goal for the Japanese was to obtain raw 
materials and foodstuffs for the war effort. To this end, 
they at first suppressed all political organizations.
Much has been written about the cruel methods of the Japa­
nese in the occupied territories and there were cases of 
forced labor and hardships. It soon became apparent, how­
ever, that the occupiers could elicit little support for 
their war efforts from Indonesians who did not wish to ex­
change one master for another. The recognition of this 
prompted the Japanese to make some concessions to Indonesian 
nationalism. Nationalist leaders like Sukarno were brought 
out of exile. Sukarno was allowed to make weekly radio 
broadcasts to the villagers and this increased his already 
large following. Sjahrir was not impeded in his attempt to 
set up an underground movement which was supposed to help 
in the event the Dutch decided to re-establish control.
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More importantly, the Japanese began to develop an Indonesian 
army that was to play a crucial role in the fight for inde­
pendence. While these actions promoted all-Indonesian na­
tionalism, other policies hindered its growth. New cleavages 
arose on the basis of Japanese collaboration versus -non-collab­
oration. Also, the Japanese did not encourage the movement 
in some areas of the archipelago, namely Kalimantan and East 
Indonesia. This served to increase the already uneven 
grov/th of the movement.
After the surrender of the Japanese to the Allies, it 
became clear to the nationalist leaders that they must move 
quickly to assert their independence prior to the return of 
the Dutch. The move was spearheaded by Sukarno who is viewed 
as the ’father of the Indonesian revolution. " Sukarno had 
helped to found the Indonesian Nationalist Party or PNI in 
1927* He had been a protege of Tjokroaminoto, a prominent 
socialist, and had earned his engineering degree and the 
title Ir. (Master of Law degree) at the Bandung Technical 
College. He had had both Moslem and Western educations and 
had the ability to synthesize Western and Islamic concepts 
with those of the still prevalent Hindu-Buddhist-tempered 
Javanese mysticism. He was able to translate this synthesis 
into terms which the peasantry could understand. The party*s 
program was complete independence for Indonesia, economically 
and politically. The PNI's program and Sukarno's oratorical 
skills created a rather large mass following. The Dutch 
arrested Sukarno and he was sentenced to three years
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imprisonment. Following his release from jail in 1931» he 
again became active in the nationalist movement. Sukarno's 
ability to find support among both the intellectuals and the 
masses was considered very dangerous and the Dutch exiled him 
to the island of Flores in 1933. He remain there until his 
release by the Japanese in 1942,
Hatta and Sjahrir, former leaders of the Indonesian 
Association in the Netherlands, were two other important 
leaders of this period. Both had studded in Holland, and, 
like Sukarno, they had previously been exiled by the Dutch 
until freed by the Japanese in 1942. They were later to 
emerge as leading proponents of Western liberal democracy 
during the post-independence period.
It became clear to Sukarno and others that a bloodless
revolution was impossible as the Japanese were telling them
that they (the Japanese) were ’merely agents of the allies”
and by no means could they ’’countenance a declaration of in-
22dependence by the Indonesians.” In March, 1945* the Japa­
nese did allow the establishment of an Investigating 
Committee for the Preparation of Independence, led by Su­
karno and Hatta. This committee continued to work toward 
independence in preparation of the Japanese surrender. On 
June 1, 1945 Sukarno delivered a speech that can be described 
as quite "revolutionary" and yet the Japanese hesitated to 
take any action against him. The ideas expressed in this
22Kahin, op. cit., p. 136.
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speech are important since they provided the "call to revolu­
tion” for the masses, and thereafter, provided the political 
philosophy for the new nation. There was a definite utopian­
ism apparent in the speech that is called the Pantja Sila 
(five principles), but it was formulated by Sukarno into terms 
that were meaningful to both educated and uneducated Indonesians. 
It is a good example of the ideological synthesis of Sukarno, 
as well as a large portion of the post-war elite. Western 
liberal democracy, Islam, Marxism, and indigenous ideas are 
joined together in what may be called the best expression of
the desires and revolutionary fervor of the newly-emerging
23nation. A careful examination is indicated.
Nationalism is the first principle that must provide 
the philosophical foundation for a free Indonesia. But this 
was not to be a narrow nationalism for it would then be 
reduced to nothing more than chauvinism. Indonesians should 
therefore desire the unity and brotherhood of the whole world.
The second principle is intemationalism or humani- 
tarianism that would be aimed not only at establishing a 
Free Indonesia, but also at making "one family of all nations." 
Sukarno emphasized that principles one and two are dovetailed 
together and one can not be present without the other.
^Quotes are taken from Kahin, on. cit., pp. 123-127. 
Sukarno's speech was not wTrxtten out beforehand and was re­
corded stenographically. Kahin uses the English translation 
made by the Ministry of Information of the R.U.S. I. under the 
title of The Birth of Pantjasila (Djakarta, 1950),
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HIntemationalism can not flower if it is not rooted in the 
soil of nationalism. Nationalism can not flower if it does 
not grow within the garden of internationalism."
Sukarno's third principle referred to representative 
government or government "by consent." He sought to alleviate 
the fears of advocates of an Islamic state by pointing out 
that representative government would provide the "best 
condition for the Islamic religion to prosper. . . ." He 
stated that "by means of agreement we shall improve all 
matters; we shall promote the interests of religion. . . ."
He went on:
If we really are an Islamic people, let us work 
hard so that most of the seats in the people's 
representative body we will create are occupied 
by Islamic delegates.
He added:
If, for instance, Christians wish every letter 
within the regulations of the state of Indonesia 
to accord with the bible then let them work to­
gether to death in order that most of the dele­
gates who enter the Indonesian representative 
body may be Christians. That is just - fair playI 
There is no state that can be called a living 
state if there is no internal struggle.
The fourth principle was that of social prosperity or
social justice. To explain, he said:
Do we want a free Indonesia where capitalists 
bear sway, or where the entire people prosper, 
where every man has enough to eat, enough to 
wear, lives in prosperity, feels cherished by 
the homeland that gives him sufficient keep.
He further explained that political democracy does not insure
economic democracy. In his opinion, what is called democracy
in countries like the United States is merely political
democracy and there is little social justice and no economic
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justice.
The people wish for prosperity. The people, 
who recently have felt themselves what it is 
not to have enough to eat nor enough to wear, 
wish to create a new world in which there is 
justice, under the leadership of Ratu Adil 
(the God of Justice). Therefore, if we truly 
understand, remember, and love the people of 
Indonesia, let us accept this principle of 
social justice which is not only political 
equality, gentlemen. In the field of economy, 
too, we must create equality, and the best 
common prosperity.
Sukarno*s fifth principle was that the organization of 
Free Indonesia should be in the light of a belief in one God. 
There was no reference to a specific deity, but rather indi­
vidual religious beliefs should be pursued in a spirit of 
mutual respect.
Sukarno ended his speech by stating that the five principles 
could be reduced to one principle, a principle for which there 
is a "genuine” Indonesian term, Gotong Rojong. Gotong RoJong 
refers to a "toiling hard together, sweating hard together, 
a struggle of help-me-to-help-you together. How fine that 
is! A Gotong Ro(jong State!" But a Free Indonesia was not 
possible unless the people were "united and determined to 
live or die for freedom," Freedom can only be "achieved and 
owned by a people whose soul is aflame with the determination 
Merdeka (freedom) or death!"
The Japanese surrender came on August 15» 19^5 and on 
August 1?» a declaration of independence was made by Sukarno.
The proclamation was read by Sukarno outside his home in 
Djakarta and was later broadcast from behind locked doors 
in the studios of the national radio service. It readst
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We, the Indonesian people, herewith proclaim 
the independence of Indonesia. All matters 
pertaining to the transfer of power, etc., 
will be carried out in the shortest possible 
time. On behalf of the Indonesian people.
Sukarno, Hatta 
On August 19t Sukarno held a mass rally in which he 
attempted to calm and reassure the peoples MWe have pro­
claimed the independence of Indonesia, We continue to 
defend that proclamation - we don't take back a single 
word. In the meantime we have already drawn up a program. 
Follow the program we have made. Be quiet, be calm, but 
be ready to receive orders from us.”
He asked the people to disperse quietly, avoid any 
appearance of violence, and return to their homes. They 
obeyed him immediately, and it appears the Japanese were so 
impressed by the control Sukarno had over the people, they 
decided not to arrest him. From this point onward, the 
Japanese offered little resistance to the idea of a free 
Indonesia.
Sukarno was selected to be the new nation's first Presi 
dent by the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee. 
Hatta was named vice-President. Within a few weeks, the 
President, vice-President, a cabinet responsible to the 
President, and an Advisory Central National Committee of
p/r
135 persons, formulated a constitution for the new state.
2^Please see Appendix for copy of 19^5 Constitution.
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Feith reports that almost all politically significant groups 
gave support to the new regime.
The Netherlands, however, was not prepared to accept 
Indonesian independence, although Queen Wilhelmina stated 
that the Dutch were not interested in the "colonial domina­
tion" of Indonesia. The Dutch Premier declared that "full" 
Indonesian independence could not be accomplished for fifteen 
or twenty years, that things must move slowly.
The British were the first allied troops to enter the 
archipelago in late September, 19^ 5. They attempted to control 
the situation until the Dutch could return. But the Labor 
Government of Clement Attlee made it clear that Britain would 
not continue to perpetuate Dutch colonialism. The British 
withdrew in November, 19^6, having lost'6.00 killed, 1,320 
wounded, and 320 missing as a result of skirmishes with the 
Indonesian nationalists.
Dutch troops landed shortly after the British and con­
siderable fighting followed. The Dutch contended that the 
Republic was merely a creation of the Japanese,but they were 
eventually forced by world opinion to give it some measure of 
de facto recognition when it became obvious that the new regime 
had the support of the majority of the people. Although the
^Herbert Feith, "Indonesia" from Kahin, ed., Govern­
ments and Politics of Southeast Asia, Second Edition(Ithacat 
Cornell University Press, 196^)7 p. 199.
Colin Mason, Understanding Indonesia (Sydney* Horwitz- 
Martin Ltd., 1970), p. fc>7.
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Republicans controlled large sections of Java (they moved the 
capital from Batavia (Djakarta) to Jogjakarta in central Java 
on January 19^6), the Dutch were able to reestablish their 
domination in the outer islands. From the middle of 19^6 • 
they began to establish "autonomous states" in the regions 
under their control. In March, 19^7» they finally agreed to 
the concept of a federation of states, with the Republic 
becoming only one of the states.
During the early years of the Republic, power passed 
from the older and more aristocratic nationalist leaders to 
a younger group, led by more leftist elements. An official 
call was made for the establishment of parties. Three parties 
assumed prominence, the Masjumi (Consultative Council of In­
donesian Muslims), the FNI (led by Sukarno), and the Socialist 
Party (led by Sjahrir and Amir Sjariffuddin). The Indonesian 
Communist Party was also reestablished at about the same time. 
Soon tensions began to develop between Republican leaders and 
parties. In 19^8, a Socialist Cabinet fell and was replaced 
by one led by Hatta and the Masjumi-PNI coalition. This 
cabinet was opposed by leftist elements who disapproved of 
Hatta*s policy of continued negotiation with the Dutch. In 
September, 19^8 a group of second-echelon Communist leaders 
staged a revolt at Madiun in East Java and bloody battles 
were fought before the Republican government supporessed it.
Aside from internal problems for the Republic, the divi­
sion of control between the Dutch and the Republic proved 
unworkable as Republican guerilla resistance increased.
6 1
General Abdul Haris Nasution, Republican military leader, 
writes that guerilla tactics were used not because of a 
belief in guerilla warfare "ideology” but because the In­
donesians could not establish a modem, organized force equal 
to the Dutch.2'* Because of this activity, the Dutch found it 
almost impossible to administer the territories under their 
supervision. After considerable prompting by other Western 
nations and extensive military setbacks, the Dutch officially 
recognized Indonesian sovereignty on December 7, 19^ 9.
The new nation was ill-prepared to meet the serious 
problems which accompanied the transfer of sovereignty.
The rapid social change of the latter colonial period had 
accelerated during the Japanese occupation and the revolu­
tionary years had produced an even greater shaking up of 
traditional society. The matter of rapid social change was 
further complicated by the uneven rates at which it had 
occurred throughout the archipelago. In addition, the Dutch, 
in reality, still controlled much of the territory of the outer 
islands where they had set up puppet states. The Indonesian 
Revolutionary Government had effective control only in parts 
of Java and Sumatra. In order to gain independence, the 
leaders had had to agree to a federal structure of government 
which favored the Dutch-controlled territories. The new re­
gime also was straddled with excessive debts of the Netherlands
27' See Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerilla V/arfare 
(Siliwangi Press, 1953T7
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East India Government (many of which were the result of Dutch 
military operations during the Revolution). The Dutch also 
demanded continued control of Western New Guinea, which would 
prove to he a future source of conflict between the two 
nations.
The archipelago itself was left with only limited per­
sonnel to perform the necessary tasks of self-government.
In contrast to the British, the colonial authorities had 
failed to create a modernized civil service or business 
class capable of giving political and economic support to 
the new regime. Over ninety per cent of the population re­
mained illiterate and impoverished. The extent of nationalist 
experience for many consisted of shouted slogans like Merdeka 
(Freedom). There was considerable shaking up of the tradi­
tional social structure caused by the strong tendency to give 
excessive power to those persons with Western educations who 
were acquainted with modem Western ways. A new status 
structure had been evolving since the Japanese occupation 
which made the "intellectual and near-intellectual class
po
of Indonesians a privileged group," In contrast, the 
favored position of the traditional aristocracy on both Java 
and the outer islands began to decline.
The most pressing problem facing the young nation was 
of course the fashioning of a political system capable of
28Willem F. Wertheim, "Changes in Indonesian Social 
Stratification," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 28 (March, 1955)» 
P. 3^.
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meeting the often contradictory needs of a highly diverse 
population. The most important cleavage to be bridged was 
the one that separated the Javanese and the non-Javanese.
It would be necessary to seek an accomodation process that 
could accomodate the economic and cultural interests of 
densely-populated, importing Java and the underpopulated, 
exporting outer region. Many of the non-Javanese feared 
the more numerous and culturally developed Javanese would 
dominate the new nation. Significant to our study was the 
added problem of different political cultures in the two 
regions. The Javanese are extremely nativistic in temper, 
stressing the need for expressive or emotive politics, 
radical nationalism, and a socialism which is not necessarily 
pro-Communist, but quite definitely anti-Western. The 
political culture of the outer islands is (with some vari­
ations) strongly attuned to Islam, is very anti-Communist 
(and therefore often identified as pro-Western), and empha­
sizes concepts like individual freedom and enterprise.
Thus the needs of both regions must be met and this 
would involve some measure of regional autonomy, at the 
same time national integrative institutions were being in­
troduced. A fragmented Indonesia would only hinder national 
political stability and development. It was necessary that 
a certain tension between local and central authority be main­
tained if conflict was to be avoided. Since the population 
itself had little or no knowledge of modem Western political 
and economic institutions, the political elite and parties,
the civil service bureaucracy, and the army were in the tenu­
ous position where they could play a crucial role in the en­
couragement or discouragement of regional conflict as they 
introduced needed changes. It was apparent that these people 
.would lead and facilitate the course of change as they set 
about ordering the daily relationships and activities of a 
complex number of cultural and regional groups. In turn, 
these diverse groups would have to bestow legitimacy on the 
central government in Djakarta, the capital of the new 
nation.
Turning to the more positive aspects of independence, 
the new nation looked forward to the end of Dutch rule.
They were a community drawn close together by years of 
suffering and the triumphal climax of the nationalist struggle. 
Although there were all kinds of organizational and material 
problems, red and white Republican flags were flown every­
where and the slogan Merdeka shouted. People were bung 
or brother to each other. Sukarno was known as Bung Karno, 
the brother. It was evident a strong ideological nationalism 
was sweeping a large portion of the people. Freedom was theirs, 
and, in Sukarno’s words, Indonesia was "no longer a coolie 
nation."
CHAPTER III 
POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND PROCESS: 19^9-1959
The initial years of Indonesian independence can be 
conveniently broken into two periods. The first begins with 
the granting of sovereignty in December of 19^9 and continues 
until the first portion of 1957. These years were marked by 
the gradual decline and abandonment of parliamentary demo­
cracy and the major feature was a malfunctioning and ineffec­
tive political party system unable to resolve political and 
economic issues. The second period commences with the de­
claration of martial law in March, 1957 because of the ex­
treme social unrest. From this point through mid-1959, 
there was a transition to the more authoritarian system of 
"guided democracy" with a decided erosion in the importance 
of Parliament and parties, and an increasing power consoli­
dation by the President and the military. Major factors 
involved in the abandonment of the parliamentary system, 
including the unresolved dispute between Java and the outer 
islands, will be examined in this chapter, but first the 
constitutional system itself is described and the key politi­
cal participants placed in their respective roles.
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The Constitutional System
The federal state of Indonesia was established by a 
"draft” constitution drawn up at the Hague "Roundtable" Con­
ference of 19^ 9. Republican negotiators found it necessary 
to agree with the Dutch that the new nation would be composed 
of Republican territory in Java and Sumatra, as well as the 
separate states set up during the war in Dutch-occupied areas. 
Almost immediate dissatisfaction was voiced against what was 
considered a "Dutch-created” federal system, a system that 
would facilitate a "divide and rule" policy by the Dutch.
It was considered a neo-colonial order which gave too much 
power to the regions where Dutch interests still prevailed, 
namely the exporting outer islands. As a consequence, a new, 
but provisional, constitution was drawn up in August, 1950.
In an attempt to shed Dutch influence, the 1950 Consti­
tution called for a single-chamber parliament which would 
elect the President and vice-President. This single-chamber 
system did favor the numerically stronger ethnic-Javanese.
It also greatly reduced Sukarno*s presidential pov/er since 
the cabinet would no longer be responsible to him, but to 
Parliament. The unitary system also allowed few concessions 
to regional interests. Following a Dutch constitutional 
practice, the President would nominate one or more cabinet 
"formateurs" in accordance with whose recommendations he 
approved a Prime Minister (one of the formateurs) and other
6?
ministers.
Ordinary legislation required the approval of the Presi­
dent, Cabinet, and Parliament. The Government eould promulgate 
emergency decrees, but to remain in force they had to be con­
firmed by the Parliament in its next session. The President 
could dissolve the Parliament, but he had to call for new 
elections within thirty days. A permanent constitution was 
to be drawn up by a duly-elected Constituent Assembly, however, 
these elections did not take place until 1955. When the Assem­
bly did eventually meet in 1956, two main issues continued to 
divide it; the revival of a bicameral Parliament with a second 
chamber designed to give the provincial authorities on the 
outer islands greater representation in central government 
machinery and the question of whether the new state would be 
religious or secular. A lack of consensus regarding these 
two issues prevented the drawing up of a permanent constitu­
tion, and, as a result, the provisional constitution and an 
appointed Parliament existed during most of the period covered 
by this study.
Within the Indonesian political system, there were grave 
difficulties in achieving cohesion under the new system. Un­
der the 1950 Constitution, as stated previously, the Cabinet 
was no longer responsible to the President,but to Parliament. 
President Sukarno accepted this considerable reduction of his 
powers with some reluctance. (It would be unfair, however, to 
say that he was only concerned with his own personal influence). 
Both Sukarno and the army regarded the adoption of the
6 8
parliamentary system with suspicion because they believed 
that the new nation needed a strong and decisive leadership 
and that Parliament would be unable to provide this. There 
is evidence to suggest that Sukarno, even at this stage, 
cooperated no more than he needed to with the parties and 
the Parliament. He was prepared to use the almost impossible 
diversity of viewpoint in the Parliament to embarrass the 
Cabinet. He was aided in this by the military who believed 
it must defend the ideology of the people and thus justified 
their intervention into political affairs. Also behind Su­
karno was his own party, the PNI, supported mainly by Java­
nese civil servants and peasants (because of their admiration 
for Sukarno). The PNI often had to stand aside while Sukarno 
attacked the party system even when it was against their in­
terests as a political party. The Masjumi, along with Sjahrir's 
Socialist Party, were the most pro-Western of the political 
parties and the strongest supporters of the parliamentary sy­
stem. Mohammed Natsir, a Masjumi leader, formed the first 
government in September, 1950.
The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was denied a parlia­
mentary role during most of the study, but did prove to be, in 
time, the strongest of all the parties. Ironically, the PKI 
became the staunchest supporter of the parliamentary system 
as it allowed them to politically mobilize the masses, 
especially in the rural areas of East and Central Java. It 
did, however, support Sukarno's conception of "guided democracy" 
when it appeared that he was going to permit the party to play
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a role in the government.
In July, 1959 the original 19^5 Republican Constitution 
was repromulgated, making President Sukarno responsible only 
to the People's Consultative Assembly, which he himself appointed. 
The repromulgation served to institutionalize the extra-parlia­
mentary power structure which had been evolving during the 
preceding years, with President Sukarno balancing himself 
between the military and the PKI.
Postrevolutionary Political Leadership
In order to better understand why effective compromises 
could not be reached within the framework of the constitutional 
system, there is need to focus on the men who occupied high 
positions in the new order. For it is,as Raymond Aron notes, 
that the real nature of a constitutional system can only be 
understood when "the men who in fact operate the system are 
taken into account.
Political power following independence was largely in
the hands of individuals who had been active participants in
2the nationalist struggle. The Dutch direct colonial adminis­
tration had permitted few Indonesians the experience of govern­
ing a modern nation-state. It was, therefore, a political 
elite that learned its political "know-how” under the chaotic
■^ Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," 
in Lewis A. Coser, ed., Political Sociology (New York; Harper 
and Row, Publishers, 19675 * p. 97.
^Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, op. cit., 
p. 100.
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conditions of the nationalist struggle. Political orienta­
tions were gained through the main strains of the movement, 
a desire for political independence and unification. There 
was conversely little in the way of organized planning and 
action with regard to future social, economic, and political 
goals.
The new leaders supplanted the Dutch who had ruled through 
economic control. Almost immediately, government assumed the 
dominant role in the society and was the principle determinant 
of social mobility. There were few countervailing pressures 
since most Indonesians were illiterate peasants and the almost 
non-existent bourgeoise was relatively weak. To be powerful 
was to be a high-ranking politician, party official, civil 
servant, or member of the military.
Significant for our study is the fact that many of the 
men making important decisions did not assume power through an 
electorate, but rather through their relationships within or 
to the civil service and the army. In many cases,there was 
an almost complete interlocking of political, civil service, 
and military leadership groups.
As a group, the new political elite comprised a signifi­
cant portion of Indonesia's new upper class. They did not 
represent a cross-section of the population, but were mainly 
from the lower rungs of the prewar aristocracy. They had 
few property ties and commitments and their power, as stated, 
was almost solely rooted in their revolutionary roles and 
positions within large bureaucratic organizations, both civil
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and private.-^  The most striking feature was that most leaders 
had had access to Western education prior to independence.
For example, two studies found that ninety-four per cent of 
the ministers, ninety-one per cent of the Parliament, and 
all major civil servants had Western, as distinct from Islamic, 
educations.^ This is understandable since the technical ex­
pertise made possible through Western educations was in great 
demand during and after the revolution.
Although social origins were fairly uniform, a distinct 
cleavage emerged within the elite during and following the 
revolution. This cleavage coincided with skill groups. One 
group of men appeared destined to be administrators, concerned 
with problem-solving and the administrative and legal aspects 
of government. They concentrated on the efficient operation 
of government agencies and sought to reinforce their positions 
by resolving pressing economic and political issues. The 
second group was composed of symbolic leaders, or, as Feith 
labels them, "solidarity makers." This latter group endeavored 
to maintain their positions by utilizing the emotional force 
of nationalism. To these men, government was not important
3lbld.. p. 102.
Malcolm R. Willison, "Leaders of Revolution: The Social 
Origins of the Republican Cabinet Members in Indonesia, 19^5- 
55." (M.A. Thesis, Cornell University, 1958) and Soelaeman 
Soemardi, "Some Aspects of the Social Origins of the Indonesian 
Political Decision-Makers," Transactions of the Third World 
Congress of Sociology (London! International Sociological 
Association, 195& )t Ills PP. 338-3^8.
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as an activity, but as an image. They were concerned with
the political system as a source of values and symbolic 
5meanings.
The two most important political figures of the post­
revolutionary scene, Hatta and Sukarno, are examples of the 
two types of leaders. Hatta, the nation's first Prime Minis­
ter and an economist by training, is described by Feith and 
others as a man who was preoccupied with the practical prob­
lems of the new state. He was a pragmatic leader, emphasiz­
ing the need for firm control by the central government, 
respect for the legal system, and the danger of expecting 
too much from self-rule. As a Sumatran, he represented the 
non-Javanese viewpoint of the outer islands and supported the 
early Masjumi governments, including the pro-Western policies. 
He was also a devout Moslem and this made him acceptable to 
strict Islamic believers who were turned away by Sukarno's 
syncretic religious approach of uniting Islam, Hindu-Buddhist, 
and indigenous beliefs. Men such as Hatta tended to balance 
the emotionalism of the symbolic leaders. A decisive split 
occurred within the elite when Hatta resigned because he no 
longer agreed with the policies being promoted by President 
Sukarno.
President Sukarno, as he himself was the first to admit, 
was no economist and disliked paying attention to the recommen­
dations of the more practical leaders who tended to concentrate 
on the routine, day-to-day matters. He is an excellent example
^Feith, The Decline of Constitutional, op. cit., p. 24-25.
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of the "solidarity maker” or charismatic leader whose claim 
to power rests on personal qualities. Max Weber went far 
toward anticipating the problems of charismatic leadership 
when he wrote that routinized behavior tends to diminish 
the impact of the charismatic leader's personal qualities.^
Bom of Javanese and Balinese parents, Sukarno drew 
most heavily on the Javanese current of thought. He was 
also one of the few Indonesian leaders who had not studied 
in Europe. His ability to blend the different elements or 
currents of Indonesian society into a seemingly harmonious 
whole was one of his major accomplishments and fitted him 
for his role as unifier. He was early recognized as a major 
national symbol and his mass appeal was heightened by his 
considerable speaking skill and magnetic personality.
During his period of political dominance, he concerned him­
self with the long-range goals and symbolisms of the revolu­
tion and spent little time on ordinary, routinized affairs of 
government. He was happiest when conveying images of the 
future to the masses in which he attempted to synthesize the 
main currents of his ideological background, nationalism, 
Marxism, and Islam. He would later join these three into 
what he called NASAKOM.
Sukarno legitimized his dominant position in several ways. 
To begin with, he believed his long association with the
^Max Weber, from H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds.,
From Max Webers Essays in Sociology (New Yorki Oxford Univer- 
sity Press, 1946), pp. 254-55.
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nationalist cause entitled him to guide the nation. It was
he who had rescued Indonesia from colonial exploitation.
He must continue to protect it from the encroachment of the
more insidious neo-colonialism. At the 1955 Bandung Conference
he warned against the false belief that colonialism was deads
They often tell us colonialism is dead. We 
must neither be deluded nor rejoice. I tell 
you that colonialism is not yet dead.
Do not imagine colonialism only in its classical 
form which we in Indonesia and our brothers in 
various parts of Asia and Africa knew.
Colonialism also appears in modem clothes - in 
the form of economic control, spiritual control 
and direct physical control exercised by a small 
group of foreigners from within the country.
He called for a continuing '"revolution" which he defined as a 
"symphony of destruction and construction, a symphony of up­
rooting and upbuilding.”  ^ To achieve these ends, Sukarno 
attempted to formulate an ideology which would justify his 
role of prominence. Accordingly, he would act as a "guide” 
for the Indonesian people in their nation-building by develop­
ing ideas and world views since it was only Bung Kamo that 
was able to see the future in a way that would be meaningful 
to all the people. Stephen Sloan writes that Sukarno was 
offering his own alternative to the "ambivalence of change
Q
that threatened the individual’s security.” . It was only
?Sukarno, "TAYIP,” Pantjasila, a Monthly Magazine on 
Indonesian Cultures and Politics, Vol. 2, No. 13 (Christmas- 
New Year 1964-65)» p. 5.
^Stephen Sloan, A Study in Political Violence (Chicago* 
Rand McNally & Company, 1971)» p. 40.
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Sukarno that could unify the people and develop the image of 
a unique form of democracy that would be suitable for Indo­
nesia. It would combine the old with the new, the traditional 
with the modern. He called for a democratic system which 
would encompass the mutual cooperation and agreement by con­
sensus of the Javanese villages. Even the Marxists could be 
drawn into such a system where Nationalism, Religion, and 
Communism would be blended into a cooperative government. 
Sukarno did initially provide an atmosphere of unity for the 
new nation, burt it proved to be rather superficial. An 
ideology, to be successful, must be converted into a program 
of practical action, and, this, Sukarno lacked.
Following independence, serious conflict erupted between 
the two skill groups. The "administrators” accused the 
"symbolic" leaders of neglecting the pressing problems of 
government, especially in the economic sphere. The "soli­
darity- makers" charged that the "administrators" were attempt­
ing to dam up the emotional zeal of the revolution and thus 
were impeding national unification. As time elapsed, it 
was evident that the cleavage was more than disagreement 
over certain issues. It became appearent that there was 
little unity of opinion and action on even essential points, 
namely the maintenance of the parliamentary regime. The 
"administrators" who sought to solve economic ills through 
foreign capital and aid were labeled pro-European and neo­
colonials willing to sacrifice what had been won in blood 
for a profit. The "symbolic" leaders, though very critical,
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were unable to offer any concrete, realistic alternatives. 
Eventually, their answer was to move away from the Western 
parliamentary system which seemed to be tarnishing revolu­
tionary enthusiasm.
After years of haggling, the postwar leadership appeared 
unable to go beyond the selection of a national flag and 
anthem. Yet, a society can only survive and prosper writes 
Aron, if there is true collaboration between groups comprising 
the ruling elite.^
Political Parties
For the most part, the post-independence parties were 
relatively small political subelites competing for the support 
of a largely illiterate and unarticulate populace. Quite 
often such things as personal appeal and opportunism determined 
party formation. Groups frequently came into existence and 
dissolved because of the personal likes and dislikes of,a 
small number of leaders. There is also the paradox that 
while most of the parties developed along strong ideological 
lines corresponding to ethnic and religious cleavages, their 
organizational structures and support were very weak. National 
politics was "essentially the struggle for power in the capital 
city by a small urban elite,Perhaps more than in other
9
Raymond Aron, op. cit., p. 78. 
l°Stephen Sloan, op. cit., p. 25.
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Asian nations, the Indonesian parties were "ineffective” as 
system-wide aggregators of interests, writes Almond and 
Coleman.11 There was thus a notable lack of integration 
between the political system and the Indonesian people.
Politics were largely an urban phenomenon involving a re­
latively small number of people. Consequently, the parties 
were rather top-heavy structures with very little base support. 
The only exception was the PKI who enlisted the support of 
the huge mass of landless peasants of East and Central Java.
The success was due to unanimity among the leadership regard­
ing a viable course of action and reform movement that 
appealed to the destitute peasantry. By 1957* the PKI had 
become the largest of the parties.
During the years covered in this study, Indonesia's 
proportional representation system encouraged the growth of 
small parties. In such a system, even small parties have a 
chance of survival and will therefore seek support by playing 
up their distinctiveness which marks them off from their rivals. 
In the Indonesian parliament, which functioned without elec­
tions until 1955* 206 seats were divided among seventeen 
parties and factions, with twenty-six other members belonging 
to no faction. As a result, all governments during these 
years were based on coalitions.
Of the numerous parties, four played a significant role,
11Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, op. cit., 
P. 569. -----
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capturing between themselves approximately seventy-eight 
per cent of the total 1955 vote. They were the Indonesian 
Nationalist Party (PNI), the two Moslem parties, Masjumi and 
the Moslem Schoolmen (NU), and the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI).
The PNI was founded in 192? by Sukarno and thereafter
12became the leading nationalist organization. It was recon­
stituted during the revolution and was very popular because 
of the roles played by its leaders. It was largely a Javanese- 
based party with its main support coming from the lower eche­
lons of the traditional Javanese elite, including many govern­
ment bureaucrats. It had a largely urban leadership and was 
pretty much under the control of Sukarno. Later, the PNI 
found It necessary to back up Sukarno even when he began to 
voice anti-party sentiments. Ideologically, the party espoused 
a strong nativism and socialist or collectivist outlook re­
garding national development. The official party line was 
Marhaenism (a reference to the "common man"), but it was 
basically a party that wished to preserve the existing frame­
work of the society and was not genuinely reformist in nature. 
It was quite conservative in many respects, although the ties 
with Sukarno encouraged some mass support. Since it stressed 
nationalism, it often adopted an anti-Western attitude. In 
general, it provided a middle ground between the religious 
parties on the right and the PKI on the left.
12On its early days, see Kahm, op. cit. , pp. 90-92.
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Masjumi and NU were the two major religious parties. 
Masjumi was founded in 1943 under Japanese auspices, composed 
of a variety of prewar Moslem political, economic, and social 
organizations.*^ It began functioning as a political party in 
November, 1945. It was the leading party of the outer islands, 
attracting large and middle-size Islamic traders and santri 
(devout Moslems) strongholds of West Java. It represented 
the Modernist trend in Islam, while NU, the conservative. 
Masjumi, like the other religious parties, employed religion 
as a means of establishing a link with the masses. But com­
peting strains within the Islamic community, as well as the 
elitist character of Indonesian politics, hindered the de­
velopment of real mass support. Of all the major parties, 
it was the most pro-Western in outlook. This tendency, as 
well as the party*s involvement in the 1958 regional re­
bellion, made it increasingly difficult to coalesce with the 
PNI in order to effect needed changes.
The NU, which split off from Masjumi in 1952, represented
14the conservative trend m  Islam. Its main support came from 
conservative landowning Ulamas (Moslem School Teachers) of 
East and Central Java. The party's interest in the preserva­
tion of an Islamic as well as Indonesian tradition caused
•^For history of development, see Deliar Noer, "Masjumii 
Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indonesia." 
(M.A. Thesis, Cornell University, i960).
-^Mochtar Naim, "The Nahdatul Ulama as a Political Party, 
1952-1955* An Inquiry into the Origins of Its Electoral 
Success." (M.A. Thesis, McGill University, i960).
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it to assume an anti-Western stance. It wasf however, very 
amti-Communist in orientation. Differences between NU and 
Masjumi precluded religious unity and Islam was not able to 
offer a viable alternative to Sukarno's "guided democracy" 
even when it meant its own extinction as a political force.
The PKI was also a Java-based party, attracting the
poor landless peasants in densely-populated East and Central
15Java and the relatively small urban and rural proletariat.
Resurgence of the PKI occurred during the initial decade 
of self-rule under the skillful leadership of Dipa Nusantara 
Aiditj however, its roots go back to the founding of Indonesian 
Social Democratic Union in 191^ by Dutch social democrats. 
During a 1926 uprising in Java and Sumatra, the organization 
was almost completely wiped out. It was revived in 19^5 when 
the Revolutionary Government asked for party participation, 
but it was again crushed during the Madiun Revolt of 19^ 8.
The PKI had attacked the Republican Government for making too 
great concessions to the Dutch and on September 18, 19^8, a 
group of Communist leaders at Madiun in East Java proclaimed a 
revolt against the Sukamo-Hatta Government. The uprising 
lasted little more than a month and the Republican Government 
suppressed it by killing off important leaders. Indonesian 
Communism thus suffered a serious setback. From a seriously
^5For history of the PKI, see Donald Hindley, The 
Communist Party of Indonesia: 1951-1963 (Berkeley* University 
of California Press, 1966) and Ruth MeVey, The Rise of 
Indonesian Communism (Ithacai Cornell University Press, 1965).
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weakened state in 1951* the new Secretary-General Aidit led
the PKI to greater strength than it had ever had. While
other parties stressed an appeal of nationalism, the PKI
offered a concrete program of social change that appealed
to the impoverished masses. On the other hand, the PKI was
not represented in the governments covered by this study.
They began to participate with Sukarno's encouragement after
the introduction of "guided democracy," Sukarno was able to
keep the party under rein, however, by manipulating it and
the military against one another.
Although the parties did not, in general, attempt to
involve the peasantry in direct political action, they were
important agents in the formation of new associations with
ostensibly non-political objectives following independence.
One study of a small town in rural Java found that of the
five women's organizations in town, only one was not in
essence the feminine wing of a political party. Three scout
troops, several youth organizations, and some small traders'
associations also appeared to have underlying party affili- 
l6ations. In this way, the parties were able to reach people 
through formal groups whose functions coincided with tradi­
tional familial, religious, social, and economic needs.
But even these organizations touched only a small minority 
of the people. Most people lived in poor, rural villages
Ann Ruth Wiliner, "Social Change in Javanese Town- 
Village Life," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. VI,
(1957-58), p. 237.
82
where life was oriented toward traditional values and customs.
It is estimated that one-half of the Javanese peasantry is
17landless, aggravating the poverty conditions. Knowledge 
of the outside world is confined to the immediate area around 
the village. Life centers around work, religious observances, 
customary holidays, and family events. People are parochially- 
inclined and the larger towns and cities are a source of con­
fusion and uncertainty. Villagers prefer to leave contact 
with this external world, insofar as possible, to those 
delegated to deal with it, the village head and his assistants. 
The few people who do see themselves as capable of influencing 
government action in Djakarta, that is, the political public, 
are residents of the larger towns and cities. They are 
generally people of relatively high social rank, village
officials, religious functionaries, labor leaders, middle-size
18traders, and revolutionary veterans.
Political Process t 19^ 9-1-959
The years immediately following independence witnessed 
the attempt, with the help of the political parties, to insti­
tutionalize constitutional democracy in Indonesia. Before 
the failure of the new system is discussed, the question regard­
ing the degree to which it was institutionalized must be 
answered.
17'Donald Hindley, op. cit., p. 5.
18Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, op. cit.,
p, 110.
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Feith argues that some of the important characteristics
1 9of a democratic polity operated during the period, 19 -^9-1957*
The system of politics which operated in those 
years and finally broke down has six distinct 
features characteristic of constitutional 
democracy. Civilians played a dominant role.
Parties were of very great importance. The 
contenders for power showed respect for 'rules 
of the game* which were closely related to the 
existing constitution. Most members of the elite 
had some sort of commitment to symbols connected 
with constitutional democracy. Civil liberties 
were rarely infringed. Finally, governments 
used coercion sparingly. This represented, at 
the very least, an attempt to maintain and de­
velop constitutional democracy.
Guy Pauker, an experienced observer of Indonesian politics,
. . 20 writes *
Half-way through its first decade of independent 
existence Indonesia seemed to be headed for 
democracy. Political activities were unre­
stricted beyond the norms of more mature sy­
stems , . . the Press enjoyed a freedom which 
was used to the point of license. The indi­
vidual felt that he lived in a free society.
The.rural masses experienced governments less 
inclined to interfere in their lives than any 
that had preceded them for generations. Low 
pressure characterized all aspects of public 
life In Indonesia, thus giving meaning to the 
slogan Merdeka (Freedom) in the name of which 
the struggle for independence had been fought.
There was, thus, an attempt, though often feeble, to main­
tain the new system. Why, then, was it eventually abandoned in 
favor of "guided democracy?” If we count the large number of 
cabinet crises during these years, it is evident that the
^Ibid. t preface, xi.
2°Guy Pauker, "The Military in Indonesia,” in John 
Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped 
Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962),
p. 220.
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most important reason is that government was not getting 
things done. Some of the governments attempted to formulate 
policies* but could not implement them. Others did not even 
make the attempt. All lacked the power to make and carry out 
needed changes.
The year, 19^9 through 1957, witnessed the fall of 
seven cabinets, most of them having relatively short lives. 
Behind this constant change was an extreme rivalry between 
parties and leaders. The two largest parties, PNI and Masjumi, 
proved to be intense rivals and there was a steady polariza­
tion of other voting groups behind one or the other of these 
two protagonists. Although both were "socialist" and 
"nationalist” in character, they were divided by the regional 
and religious issues. Another problem lay in the inherent 
differences in the temperament and approach of party leaders. 
Masjumi leaders tended to be "administrative" leaders while 
PNI leaders moved toward symbolism and mass appeal. Masjumi-led 
governments were in power for just over a year during the 
1950-1957 period, PNI governments for just under two years, 
and coalition governments for just over three years.
It was widely hoped the 1955 General Election would 
give a substantial amount of support to one of the major parties 
so that the problems of coalition government could be over­
come. This was not the case. Instead, the PNI received 22.3 
per cent of the vote; Masjumi, 20.9; NU, 18.b; and the PKI, 
I6.it.21
21A. van Marie, "The First Indonesian Parliamentary 
Elections,” Indonesie, Vol. IV (1956), p. 258.
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The issue of whether the state should be secular or 
Islamic divided the Moslems, as stated, to such a degree that 
religious unity was impossible. The matter of religion also 
divided the Moslem and secular parties such as the PNI. The 
struggle between the proponents and opponents of ideological 
Islam is basic to postrevolutionary history, but it is of 
much older origin. The Dutch had in effect imposed an uneasy 
truce during the colonial period. Religious conflict emerged 
again early in the nationalist movement and continued to 
plague the new nation. The struggle was intensified by the 
1955 election campaign which had as its major issue, the 
secular versus Islamic state conflict. Inevitably, because 
of the distribution of Islamic strength, the resolution of 
the dispute became entangled with the fate of the regional 
conflict. In the early years of independence, the more 
liberal Masjumi was usually in conflict with NU which demanded 
an absolute Islamic state. Opposed to the idea were the 
PNI and the PKI, There was some cooperation between the PNI 
and Masjumi for a short period of time, but as the PNI began 
to show some signs of friendliness with the pKI (they both 
competed for the same Javanese constituency), Masjumi, in 
retaliation, drew closer to the other Moslem parties. By 
this time, however, it was too late and the issue of Moslem 
unity was no longer a powerful political force.
Masjumi and PNI also disagreed with regard to their 
attitudes toward the Western nations, including both foreign 
capital and aid. Masjumi was strong on the outer islands
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and therefore was interested in furthering trade agreements 
with the Western countries. The interests of the exporting 
islands were at stake. The PNI preferred an anti-Western 
capital and aid stance. Sukarno was quoted as saying that 
the United States "could go to hell" with her aid. Leaders 
and parties who were willing to align themselves with foreign 
capitalists were frittering away that nationalist struggle for 
the sake of economic advantage. In the face of such sharply 
divided attitudes, political consensus was unattainable.
From the very beginning the Indonesian Government, 
hampered by a lack of trained administrators and confronted 
by the aftermath of guerilla warfare in its territory, had 
difficulty in asserting its authority and imposing law and 
order. There were almost constant regional uprisings during 
these early years, each one of them clearly a danger to the 
central government. The outer region constantly badgered the 
central government for greater regional autonomy. The Javanese 
who dominated Parliament and the civil service bureaucracy con­
sidered this a threat to territorial integrity. The military 
found itself divided in this issue, with many army officers on 
the outer islands supporting regional claims.
By early 1957t it was apparent the fragmented leadership 
and political party system were incapable of providing authori­
tative and purposeful government. The defeat of the new 
system lay in the nation*s colonial history, its extreme in­
ternal conflicts, poor economic decisions, and, eventually, 
open revolt between Java and the outer region. To replace
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the ineffective parliamentary system, Sukarno proposed what 
he called1’guided democracy,” which was to be a mixture of 
Indonesian and Western democratic institutions.
In the following section, there is an attempt to relate 
major issues to changing alignments between the regional blocs, 
the parties, army leadership, and President Sukarno. By 
this means, we will trace the decline of liberal democracy 
and the introduction of the more authoritarian system.
The Problem of Order and Authority
As early as 1950* it was evident the outer islands and 
certain parts of Java were fertile ground for armed revolt 
against the Djakarta government. An armed uprising among 
the Ambonese, inhabitants of the Moluccas, culminated in 
the proclamation of an independent ”Republic of the South 
Moluccas” on April 2^ , 1950. The Ambonese, divided from 
Java by race, religion, and geography, had been content to 
live under Dutch rule and felt little loyalty to the new 
Republic. Most of the Ambonese were Christians and had been 
members of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (K.N.I.L.).
They believed they stood to lose if the Dutch pulled out 
completely and there was real resistance to a Unitarian form 
of government wherever large numbers of the K.N.I.L. remained 
mobilized, Republican officials tried to allay some of these 
fears by telling the troops that many would be absorbed into 
the new Indonesian army. The Dutch gave these people the option 
of immigrating to the Netherlands rather than submitting to
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Republican rule. Some left the archipelago and are, today, 
still living in government camps in Holland. There was thus 
a strong thrust for these people to maintain Dutch commitments. 
It was not until November, 1950, that the rebel capital of 
Amboinia was occupied by the Indonesian army, after a long 
economic blockade and a struggle that destroyed the greater 
part of the town and rendered 20,000 persons homeless,
Soumokil, leader of the revolt, fled to Ceram where he 
maintained sporadic resistance. As late as December, 1957$ 
adherents of the "South Moluccas Republic" were reported to 
be entrenching in western Ceream.
Meanwhile the Government in Djakarta was confronted by 
serious disorder in Java itself, where during 1950 $ the country 
was overrun by armed bands drawn from ex-guerilla fighters 
who preferred pillage to demobilization. By the middle of 
1950, the army had succeeded in suppressing most of the bandits. 
It was, however, still faced by the Darul Islam, to which 
those remaining adhered.
The Darul Islam Movement began in March, 19^8, like the 
Communist uprising later in the year, as an extremist reaction 
to the "Renville Agreement." A Good Offices Committee, 
sponsored by the United Nations, proposed under the "Renville 
Agreement" that there should be a truce between Republicans 
and Dutch using the "Van Mook" line to divide the warring 
parties. Accordingly, the Republic was limited to a little 
over one-third the area of Java (the east central section minus 
all deep water seaports) plus the extreme western tip of the
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island, half of Madura, and the largest, but poorest, part of 
Sumatra. In response to this agreement, the Darul Islam was 
founded by a former Masjumi reader, Kartosuwirj o, who sought 
to transform Indonesia into a strictly orthodox theocratic 
"Realm of Islam" (Darul Islam). The movement drew its main 
support from west Java and the areas that had been traditional 
centers of Moslem protest against "infidel" rule of the Dutch 
and the post-independence secular parties. It had been, in 
fact, the effective administrative control over much of V/est 
Java, The movement established links with armed Moslem 
insurgents on the outer islands. In 1951$ & former army 
colonel, Kahar Mazakkar, proclaimed the adherence of South 
Celebes to the Darul Islam and began destroying villages to 
force the inhabitants to join the movement. In September,
1953 a number of concerted uprisings occurred among the 
fanatically Moslem and separatist Achinese in the far north 
of Sumatra. The leader, Daud Beureueh, announced the 
secession of Atjaeh from the Indonesian Republic and its 
attachment to Kartosuwirjo*s Darul Islam. Although Government 
military posts held out, the rebels soon controlled the 
greater part of the countryside. Later, the Republican 
District Military Commander, Colonel Simbolon, had a limited 
success in quelling the revolt.
The movement then extended its influence into Borneo.
In 1955t a Darul Islam "Cabinet" was appointed and the leader 
Muzakkar and his bands ravaged the country around Macassar in 
the Celebes. At the end of March, 1955> they were said to be 
in possession of the coastal areas of South Celebes and Djakarta
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reported the total number of homeless refugees exceeded one 
million. In May, 1956, an attempt to seize Macassar itself 
was thwarted by the army. The movement, however, remained 
extremely active in V/est Java, and as late as May, 1957» 
the Indonesian Army had to fight a major engagement to clear 
the road between Bogor and Bandung for President Sukarno and 
his Russian visitor, Marshal Voroshilov.
Beginning in 1957t the Permesta Movement followed a 
different path of violent conflict. Led by regional politi­
cal leaders and military officers, the movement aimed at 
greater regional autonomy of the outer islands. Instead 
of religious conflict, there was a deep dissatisfaction 
with the lack of meaningful provision for self-government 
in the outer islands, especially the lack of control in 
fiscal matters. Sizeable sums were sent to the central 
treasury, but little was returned for regional development.
The huge Javanese population required most of the country's 
tax dollar. By 1958, wide-scale armed revolt emerged in 
Sumatra, the leaders being joined in their opposition to 
Communism (the PKI's growing influence in the central govern­
ment), in their desire for a federal union of states which 
would give greater representation to the outer islands, and 
in their dislike of Sukarno's increasing assumption of 
personal power.
In the face of these complaints, the central government's 
greatest asset was its tendency not to drive matters to a 
head, to let time rim its course, a typical Javanese trait.
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While this policy protected the central government by pre­
venting political collapse of the regime over the question 
of regional conflict, it also created a reluctance to formu­
late a clear-cut program regarding the local autonomy. Much 
was promised but little was delivered. An atmosphere of 
uneasiness and discontent thrived in the face of such in­
decision.
Regional Differences
Regional differences between Java and the outer islands 
have existed since time immemorial. As stated previously, 
two basically different types of civilizations arose on the 
basis of irrigated and shifting agriculture. The two areas 
also had somewhat different experiences during the colonial 
period as well as during the years of war and revolution. 
Intensity of religious affiliation also divide the two.
The unity that was forged by a common struggle for inde­
pendence began to dissapate following the granting of sovereignty 
in 19^ 9. The fragmented leadership and party system did not 
function in terms of meeting the demands of a diverse nation.
It has been proposed that effective and stable democratic 
orders face serious obstacles in plural societies where 
clearly discernible minorities preclude a "common social 
demand.” In the absence of voluntary groups that cross-cut 
deep cultural cleavages, it is necessary that there be an 
overarching cooperation at the elite level during the initial 
period of independence. Unfortunately, politics was transformed
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into a struggle at the elite level during the initial period 
of Indonesian self-rule. In addition, the parties did not 
function as aggregators of diverse elements, hut on the basis 
alirans or currents of thought which precluded one another 
and exacerbated the regional conflict. One is the Javanese 
Tradition, an important influence on the ethnic Javanese.
It stresses the importance of continuity and order, and a 
belief that inner feelings are more important than overt 
actions. One must seek a harmony between himself and the 
cosmos. It encourages a belief in and a search for the 
magic formula and thus encourages a strong element of messi­
anic hope, explaining the Javanese predisposition to the 
charismatic leader. Sukarno, in particular, manipulated 
this current of thought. There is further the emphasis on 
refinement and formal etiquette evolving around the kratons 
sind felt most strongly by aristocratic Javanese. The peasantry, 
on the other hand, has been most strongly affected by the 
communal life of the village, with its festivals, supersti­
tions, and mutual cooperation. On the outer islands, there is 
a much greater emphasis of the Moslem Tradition. The orthodox 
Moslem makes no distinction between secular and sacred. Both 
must be embued with religion. For this reason, many Moslems 
believed the Pantja Sila fell short of the requirements of the 
Islamic state which Moslem teaching advocates. Within Islam 
there are of course the Modernists, the Orthodox, as well as 
the syncretic Javanese who have combined Moslem teachings 
with traditional beliefs.
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Reinforcing these two currents of thought are the geo­
graphical, technological, and economic differences between 
Java and the outer islands. The political unity of the 
society was threatened as the political parties and their 
leaders organized party structures on the basis of these 
differences. The country was further divided along this 
very deep cleavage. The ideological conflict of the na­
tional elite was in this way transmitted down to the village 
level, especially during the election campaigns.
It is important to repeat that Java contains almost 
two-thirds of the total population, but barely one-fourteenth 
of the land area, while Sumatra and Sulawesi, of the outer 
islands, provided about eighty-five per cent of the foreign 
exports upon which Indonesia's badly needed foreign currency 
reserves depended. Growing resentment arose in the outer 
islands because it was believed that a disproportionate amount 
of export earnings were being spent on overpopulated Java.
It was tempting to continue the barter trade which had begun 
during the blocades of the 19^0's, To some, it was appropri­
ate in light of the central government's economic mismanage­
ment. In this way, exports were delivered to foreign ports 
without going through the central government officials. The 
intense power struggles between PNI and Masjumi, however, 
made some kind of accommodation practically impossible to 
achieve.
The Army and Its Role in the Regional Conflict
Many of the separatist sentiments were further encouraged
9k
by the Indonesian army itself. The army has always regarded 
itself as the protector of revolutionary spirit. The frequent 
interference of army leaders in politics and of politicians 
in the army created a serious problem.
A notable instance occurred in 1952 when the Sultan of 
Jogjakarta, Minister of Defense in the "coalition” Wilopo 
Government, was seeking with the support of Army Chief of 
Staff Nasution, to reduce an army that was swollen with 
ex-guerilla units to a disciplined non-political force.
The Sultan proposed a reduction from 200,000 to 100,000 men.
This action threatened the position of the PNI military 
supporters, who, along with the PKI and the more extreme 
Moslem parties, attacked the policies of the Defense Minis­
ter and the Army High Command, accusing them of being unduly 
influenced by the Dutch and of seeking to destroy the army's 
revolutionary "zeal." A motion was passed in Parliament im­
plying criticism of the Minister. On the next day, however, 
October 1?, 1952, rioters besieged the Parliament Building 
demanding the summons of an elected Parliament. The army 
occupied Djakarta in force. This has generally been inter­
preted as a demonstration of strength by General Nasution 
and the territorial commanders in favor of the Sultan's 
policies. The opposition, President Sukarno and the PNI, 
however, had the last word. Three of the territorial commanders 
were deposed by their seconds-in-command upon their return to 
their military districts. These seconds-in-command proclaimed 
their fidelity to Sukarno, Both Nasution and the Sultan had
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to resign by the end of the year.
In the summer of 1955* some regional commanders opposed 
the appointment of Colonel Bamban Utojo, a man of PNI sym­
pathies, by a FNI-led Cabinet, as chief of staff. The instal­
lation ceremony of the Colonel was boycotted by virtually 
every officer invited. The Acting Chief of Staff Lubis re­
fused to surrender his authority to Utojo. He defended his 
actions by saying that he had to denounce the politicians who 
were attempting to split the army along Java-outer islands di­
visions. The Cabinet itself was threatened as a result of 
the military behavior and within a few days was forced to re­
sign. A Masjumi-led Government succeeded it and reappointed 
Nasution as Chief of Staff and reinstated Lubis who had been 
dismissed.
In March, 1956, the Masjumi-led Government was succeeded 
by a PNI-Masjumi coalition, in which, however, the PNI held 
the principal portfolios. In the ensuing months impatience 
grew within army circles on the outer islands at the seeming 
lethargy and corruption thought to characterize the central 
government. Following an announcement of a campaign against 
corruption, Gondokusomo, Minister of Justice, was himself 
arrested and convicted of bribery. In August, 1956, charges 
of corruption were placed against another former Cabinet Minis­
ter and senior Government officials. Even revelations of corrup­
tion and attacks on the President began to appear in the Press. 
Revelation of changes in Sukarno's personal life at about this 
time serious affected his image in many quarters. He had
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secretly married Heriata Hartini Suwondo, the wife of an oil 
company official Sukarno had met during a ceremonial visit to 
Surakarta in 1953. Hartini divorced her husband to marry 
Sukarno, but Sukarno did not divorce Fatmawati, his third wife, 
by whom he had now had two sons and two daughters. Under Is­
lamic law he was not required to do so, but many Indonesians 
had been trying very hard to obtain legislation to make polygamy 
illegal. They were very annoyed at the President for what they 
considered to be a betrayal. Moreover, Fatmawati was very 
popular and was widely respected as the first lady of Indonesia, 
In the meantime, Sukarno was spending money quite freely on 
foreign travel and luxurious living arrangements, refusing to 
listen to the advice from experienced advisors about the 
country's growing fiscal problems. "Economics," he is said 
to have remarked, "make my head ache," After the declaration 
of martial law in 1957» the Central Military Command made it an 
offense to indulge in "destructive and provacative news report­
ing," thus limiting some of the negative reports on political 
figures.
The dissatisfaction so prevalent in the outer islands 
during this time soon found its spokesman in many of the 
army district commanders. A decided split occurred within 
the military between those officers favoring regional challenges 
and those supporting the Central Command and the Javanese po­
sition. Meanwhile, the vice-President, Dr. Hatta, the only 
political figure of comparable public stature to the President, 
announced his resignation. It was obvious at this point that
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the question of power consolidation would be dependent on
the President and the army and not the political parties.
Previously, Sukarno and the army had, to some degree, been
balanced against one another. As Feith notes, no cabinet
could go too far afield of either Sukarno or the army with-
22out courting overthrow. The maintenance of the balance,
however, depended on a minimal consensus among army commanders.
It became apparent that during 1956 ana 1957* there had been
a strengthening of the pro-Sukarno and radically nationalist
elements in the Central Command of the army to the detriment
of the regional commanders.
There is really no easy way to describe the army in
terms of the postrevolutionary political scene. The officer
23corps was quite divided, the origins of its men varied. ^
Some had had prewar Dutch military experience. Others began 
their careers in para-military organizations set up by the 
Japanese. Some had been members of guerilla bands operating 
during the revolution. In addition, the development of the 
army differed from island to island. A territorial organi­
zation evolved with military districts roughly coinciding with 
provincial divisions. There were almost constant protests 
by officers against what they considered to be civilian
22Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, 
op. cit. . p. 39IT ~
2^For information on the army, see Kahin, Nationalism 
and Revolution, op. cit.; Guy Pauker, "The Role of the' Mill- 
tary in Indonesia," op. cit. ; and, Daniel S. Lev, "The Political 
Role of the Army in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, 
no. 4, (Winter 1963-64).
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inadequacy. Encouraged by regional civilian politicians, 
some of the district commanders began to openly defy the 
authority of the central government. The internal dispute 
within the military assumed a Javanese-dominated Central 
Command in Djakarta versus panglimas or regional commanders 
on the outer islands. After the declaration of martial law 
in 1957# some regional officers took over the local govern­
ments by illegal proclamation. As the new nation began to 
experience severe problems during 1956 and 1957# tbe officer 
corps insisted that they must act in order to save both 
themselves and the state. As a consequence, army leaders 
stepped directly into the political arena and became prime 
contenders for political power.
The main opponents of the army were the political 
parties, whose survival was threatened by army challenge to 
the parliamentary system. The party system, however, v/as all 
but paralyzed by internecine conflict. A steady stream of 
complaints flowed from both military and civilian leaders on 
the outer islands. These complaints took the form of com­
plaints against an administrative framework which took little 
account of ethnic and cultural communities, the appointment 
of Javanese officials to local administrative posts, and the 
extremely inequitable fiscal allocation. Republican leaders 
in Djakarta had been promising a greater degree of local autonomy 
to the outer region since the period of the Ambonese uprising, 
but in fact little progress had been made. As a result, the 
situation culminated into wide scale rebellion by the outer
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islands in 1953.
The Response of the Parties
In general the regional dispute proved to he very de­
bilitating to the parties. No party seemed strong enough 
to resolve the issue of regional autonomy. Many leaders 
appeared to be more concerned with finding ways out for 
themselves as individuals rather than saving their parties* 
influence. The nation moved closer to a point where Parlia­
ment was almost totally ineffective. As a consequence, extra- 
parliamentary forces, namely the President and the army, began 
to seize undue amounts of power in the absence of authoritative 
government.
It has already been noted that the major parties were 
unevenly distributed throughout the archipelago. All found 
some support in heavily-populated Java, but Masjumi's main 
centers of strength were located on the outer islands, while 
PNI, NU, and PKI were Java-based, For this reason party 
conflicts tended to take on a regional complexion. Masjumi, 
in particular, became identified with an anti-Javanese out­
look. Its major Javanese support came not from Javanese but 
from the Sudanese in West Java. These divisive tendencies 
mitigated against strong and stable parliamentary government.
During the early years of independence, the most power­
ful party appeared to be Masjumi, More than another other group, 
it tended to represent the interests of the exporting outer 
islands, Masjumi thus tended to support a regional solution 
that would be favorable to the outer region. The party*s
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future, in fact, depended upon such a solution.
As anti-West sentiments began to build in the new nation, 
the PNI and NU assumed greater prominence at the expense of 
Masjumi. PNI and NU were more inclined to take on the Java­
nese position that the regional dispute was a threat to 
national existence. They tended to be more harsh with the 
regional dissidents. Without a viable coalition between 
Masjumi and PNI, Parliament was immobilized.
The PKI also supported the concept of a Javanese-dominated 
central government as it had much to fear from regional 
challenges from the strongly Moslem outer territory which 
was also very anti-Communist. The PKI did not seem to be 
as hurt by the anti-party sentiments so prevalent during 
1956 and 1957 since it had not participated in the much- 
cursed party cabinets and it had not tied itself ideologi­
cally to constitutional democracy. Under these circum­
stances, some non-Communists, including members of the PNI, 
the civil service, and the army itself, began to look on 
the PKI as the future government. On the other hand, the 
PKI was still far from a position in which it could make a 
serious bid for power. Its opposition was very strong indeed. 
Most army officials and the Moslem parties were very much 
against PKI participation in the central government. The 
restive peasants, however, were drawn to the PKI,the only 
party with a concrete course of action for land reform and 
economic stabilization. In the face of regional conflict, 
the PKI made a concerted effort to support President Sukarno
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and the Javanese position. This was a valuable link to the 
President, but it also was dangerous in that it made him 
susceptible to criticism from groups whose help he needed, 
namely the Moslem NU and Masjumi. When their help was not 
forthcoming, he began to rely more and more on a course of 
action which balanced the PKI and the army against one another, 
with himself in the center. In the process,he contributed 
to the breakdown of the party system.
The state of the parties revealed the depth of division 
between the different groups in society, particularly the 
regional cleavage. When the 1955 General Election did not 
break the deadlock in Parliament, the following years, 1956 
and 1957* saw further fragmentation of the system. The 
voting revealed little more than that the main support for 
the PNI, NU, and PKI came from East and Central Java, while 
Masjumi obtained over half of its support from outside Java.
The voting pattern thus emphasized the strength and nature 
of regional divisions within the country. In retrospect, 
the General Election created further divisive elements 
within Indonesian society. Party leaders emphasized their 
ideological positions to appeal to different segments of 
the electorate and in so doing, they aggravated the divisions 
between these segments. Feith states that these ideologically 
reinforced divisions in society at large operated to sustain 
newly sharpened cleavages in the political elite. Members 
of the elite became more and more closely bound to their 
party and ideological supporters and thus felt less sense of
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a common fate with their fellow members of the political elite
who were of other parties. Leaders of the government and
opposition behaved with less restraint in their relations with 
pLleach other. Opposition leaders were more lxkely to block 
the execution of controversial government policies. For in­
stance, leaders would assume the attitudet "We are Masjumi 
and we don't like Prime Minister Ali because he is against 
Islam. So we won't help the government in this scheme for 
low-price purchasing of rice." Economic reforms and other 
programs, bound to cut across Java-outer island party member­
ships, were shelved because their implementation would 
threaten the party in power at the time.
In examining party structure and politics during the 
19^ -9-1957 period, it is obvious that there was a notable lack 
of unity between the parties and the mass of the peasant 
population. National integration and development were hampered 
by the difficulty of communication between the urbanized 
nationalist leadership and the people who were still largely 
absorbed in the traditional cultures. Within the ruling elite 
and the parties, there was further disunity. Ethnic and 
regional cleavages complicated the situation. In the absence 
of a strong concentration of power, the exercise of stable 
and effective government was impeded. The extreme fluidity 
and instability of the post-independence years contributed 
to the willingness of many leaders to have the democratic
PIl
Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy,
op. cit.. pp. 570-571.
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regime overthrown. The open rivalry and failures of the 
system eventually led to the consolidation of power into 
the hands of men not committed to Western liberal democracy.
President Sukarno and Guided Democracy
President Sukarno was able to consolidate political 
power around himself because he offered an alternative to 
the divisiveness of party politics. He would be the unifier 
of the new nation. Only he. Bung Kamo, could be successful 
in joining the opposing elements of the society into a 
cooperative government. But while he talked of the need 
for unity and his integrating power, he maneuvered ideo­
logical differences between groups in order to justify and 
maintain his position. He has been described by one po­
litical analyst as a "national leader who spoke for con­
sensus while he played up divisions to secure his place in
2 *5the political process and in history." To the PNI and other 
ardent nationalists, who were dependent on him for support, 
he stressed the symbolic language of nationalism and tra­
ditionalism. He proposed economic and social reforms that 
could be acceptable to the PKI, but he constantly kept the 
threat of the army over their heads. To the military, he 
offered increased military expenditures and an aggressive 
foreign policy (especially against the Dutch and Malaysia), 
but he never let them forget that the Communists were waiting
2^Stephen Sloan, op. cit., p. 2^.
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in the wings to take over. To the ardent Islam adherents* 
he provided an ideology that stressed the importance of 
religion* but played on their fears of Javanese and Commu­
nist domination.
By 1956* President Sukarno was openly criticizing 
parliamentary democracy* suggesting a system more suited 
to the Indonesian character than this "liberal* free-fight* 
fifty plus one majority* oppose for the sake of opposition 
democracy, that caricature of real participation by the 
people in the act of governing." In the autumn of 1956, 
he launched a strong campaign against what he called the 
"disease of partyism." He advocated a new "konsepsi" for 
Indonesia, a system of government more in keeping with the 
Javanese desire for harmony and which drew upon the tra­
ditional village principles of discussion and deliberation. 
His view* which he expressed in a series of speeches up 
and down the countryside was* broadly* as followst that 
the endeavor to secure freedom from want (to which priority 
was given in the Communist world) should be given priority
over the attainment of freedom of expression (to which
26priority was given in the Western world). He stated 
that the people must be "organized, guided, and taught 
from above" since this kind of leadership had worked in 
a much better way for the Soviet U n i o n . H e  therefore
26Speech by Sukarno on February 25, 1957.
2^Speech by Sukarno on April 17, 1957.
105
advocated the abolition of the "system of opposition which 
aimed solely at the downfall of the Government of the day" 
in favor of one which "would compete in bringing forth 
original and fresh ideas to the solutions of the problems
p O
of the country." He called for the dissolution of parties, 
after which "it could be determined whether Indonesia should 
have a single party system or a limited number of rational 
parties.,l2^
Upon the basis of the election results, Sukarno argued 
that the threefold division between the Nationalists, Moslems, 
and Communists should be blended into a cooperative govern­
ment policy which he referred to as NASAKOM. He was explicit 
in his pronunciations that he sought to save democracy and 
not to destroy it. In his inaugural address to the Constituent 
Assembly on November 10, 1956* he said* "We cannot copy the 
liberal democracy of the West." (He later explained that this 
required a certain amount of literacy and prosperity that 
Indonesia did not yet possess.) "Neither can we import the 
conception of dictatorship from another range of ideas.” 
Instead, he proposed a political system that would permit 
guidance from "above" and he invoked the mystique of Gotong 
Ro.jong democracy, that would be typically Indonesian and 
would take into consideration the basic principles of the 
past. Such a system would permit unity among the diverse
p O
Speech by Sukarno on April 20, 1957.
29^Speech by Sukarno on April 20, 1957.
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elements.
In these speeches it is apparent that Sukarno was 
attempting to construct an official ideology, using the main 
currents of the Indonesian political scene. He envisioned, 
as stated, a system that would allow, with equal footing, 
the three main currents* Nationalism, Islam, and Communism.
This would be his policy of NASAKCM, Sukarno displayed 
the typical Javanese tendency toward syncretism in an 
effort to water down potential conflicts. A great deal of 
tolerance and passivity still remain the most powerful 
determinants of group behavior in this region. It was an 
image that would appeal to many segments of the population.
It was much easier, however, to coin a slogan than it was to 
gain acceptance for his proposals. Masjumi, in particular, 
was not overjoyed in the thought of having Communist partici­
pation in the government. Sukarno answered* "Can we ignore 
a party that has secured six million votes in the election?"
Much has been written concerning Sukarno's relationship 
with the FKI. Politically, he needed the PKI, the most anti­
military of the parties, to balance against the army. Sukarno*s 
thinking, however, could not be called Marxist, except in a 
very diluted sense. He did not stress class conflict and it 
was apparent that he did not wish to antagonize any large 
section of the population. His philosophy emphasized that 
the great majority of people were small people, marhaens, 
eking out a precarious living. Communism, in the sense that 
Sukarno used, referred to the mutual aid so prevalent in
10?
traditional society. V/ertheim writes of Sukarno that his
30radicalism was one of words rather than of actual policy.^ 
His positive attitude toward revitalizing traditional values 
and his hesitancy to alienate sections of the society kept 
him from pursuing a more radical course of action. So al­
though Sukarno was not an orthodox Marxist, he did not hesi­
tate to use the PKI in his bid for power.
In a radio broadcast on February 1, 1957* Sukarno 
made the following proposals t He asked for the appointment 
of an all-party cabinet that would include the Communists.
He also asked for the establishment of a (non-elected) 
National Advisory Council, headed by himself, and repre­
senting all sections of the community, to give the cabinet 
solicited and unsolicited advice.
The proposals were supported by the PNI and the PKI, 
but the other parties were hostile. One by one, they re­
fused to participate in the cabinet or the Advisory Council. 
Dr Hatta came out in opposition, saying that the President's 
plan was unrealizable because of the widely differing aims 
of the religious parties and the Communists.
Things came to a head in March, 1957 with the fall of 
the second Ali Cabinet. At the same time martial law was 
instituted and this marked the beginning of the end of 
parliamentary democracy. Martial law legalized the entry of
-^Willem F. Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and After the 
Untung Coup," Pacific Affairs, XXXIX, no. 1 & 2, p. 117.
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the officer corps into the political life of the nation.
Many of the officers, especially in the Central Command,
desired a highly disciplined social order unhampered by
parliamentary politics. The powers given to the army under
the state of siege were extensive. Army leaders placed
severe restrictions on party activities and many members of
Parliament were arrested on various grounds. Daniel Lev
writes that although it was not always evident, because of
the dominating figure of Sukarno, the main driving force
31behind "guided democracy” was the army.-v In the midst of 
oppressive military control, Sukarno's new "konsepsi" was 
formally introduced.
Like every cabinet before it, the second Ali Cabinet 
had been based on a coalition, this time of the PNI (the 
party of the Premier), Masjumi, NU, and a few minor parties.
At the fall of the cabinet, President Sukarno entrusted the 
PNI leader, Mr. Suwirjo, with the task of forming a cabinet 
based on a PNI-NU coalition. This failed because of the 
refusal of NU to serve without Masjumi, who, in turn, re­
fused to have anything to do with the new cabinet. Meanwhile, 
the PKI threatened a nation-wide strike if an "unfair cabinet" 
were formed without its participation.
Accordingly, President Sukarno, assuming the role of 
formateur himself, gathered together, by unorthodox means, 
an emergency extra-parliamentary cabinet. The cabinet included
31Daniel Lev, op. cit., p. 59.
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four members of the NU, three members of the PNI, one of 
Masjumi (who was disowned by his party), and eight non-party 
members. These were supposed to be experts whose leadership 
Sukarno entrusted to Dr. Djuanda Kartawijaja, a non-party 
veteran of many Indonesian governments. The new government 
which took office in April, 1957 was strongly attacked by 
Masjumi, who regarded it as unconstitutional. Their dislike 
was increased by the fact it included three members who were 
generally held to be Communist sympathizers.
On May 8, 1957 an emergency law provided for the setting 
up of the National Advisory Council. Its members, who were 
to be nominated and discharged by the President, represented 
"functional groups" (peasants, workers, youths, businessmen, 
women, etc.) which constituted national forces not properly 
represented under the existing party structure. It was 
supposed to counter the ideological nature of the political 
parties and Parliament. It also Included personalities well 
acquainted with regional issues, military and civil functionaries, 
and Cabinet Ministers. It communicated its opinions through 
the President and met whenever he, the vice-chairman, and five 
members deemed it necessary. The Council, whose advice, the 
Prime Minister subsequently explained, would not be binding, 
was formally installed on July 12. Forty-two members, including 
some from the extreme political left, were appointed. It 
endorsed a "New Life Movement" obviously launched by the 
President, calling for a "mental revolution" among 
Indonesians. The PKI, in a gesture of friendship toward
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the President, ordered all party leaders in the regions to 
assist in its implementation.
The machinery of "guided democracy" was further built 
up in late 1958, when a law setting up a National Planning 
Council came into force. This body had the task of pre­
paring and supervising the execution of a "national re­
construction plan" covering all aspects of national life.
The members, about sixty, were to be experts, among them 
military officers and other persons experienced in regional 
affairs. The Council would receive "messages" from the 
President which it could use as a guidance or directive.
With the formation of the machinery of "guided democ­
racy" the public began to perceive the Sukarno-selected 
Cabinet, the Presidentially-selected National Council, and 
the President himself as collectively constituting the new 
government. The important factor was that Sukarno had 
succeeded in making his rule acceptable to the officer 
corps and other groups who were in a position to oppose him. 
Previous governments had failed to do so. There was thus 
a shift from the Parliament and the parties to the President 
and the National Council, backed by military strength. Be­
ginning with this period, the national political scene 
assumed the complexion of a balancing act, with the army 
and the PKI poised against each other, and, Sukarno, in the 
center, acting, as one political observer put it, as a
•^Donald Hindley, op. cit., p. 215.
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linchpin. The parties, some of whom were banned by govern­
ment decree, began to drop out of sight. It was obvious 
that the new system of authoritarian government was firmly 
entrenched when the Parliament itself was suspended in i960.
Dutch Expulsion and the P.R.R.I. Rebellion
"Guided Democracy" was introduced in the midst of 
great confusion and uncertainty. Social unrest and political 
instability were at a high. Much of it was the result of 
an anti-Dutch campaign spearheaded by Sukarno. Sukarno 
had warned that if the United Nations did not back Indo­
nesia's claim to West Irian, the Indonesians might use 
methods that "would startle the world" in order to win the 
territory. On November 18, Sukarno addressed a rally in 
Djakarta in which a resolution was passed which demanded 
that should the United Nations fail to uphold Indonesia's 
claim, then the Government should nationalize the vital en­
terprises owned by the Dutch. When the United Nations failed 
to give the necessary two-thirds vote in favor of the Indo­
nesian claim, the Government ordered a general strike against 
all Dutch enterprises for December 2. Local boycotts against 
Dutch concerns had already begun and on December 3, workers 
began taking over Dutch concerns. After a few days, the 
Cabinet legalized the seizure of this property and issued 
an appeal, which the labor unions disregarded, to cease other 
such actions. On December 13, General Nasution, using his 
power under martial law, prohibited further seizures.
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Meanwhile on the outer islands, the military commanders 
had forestalled similar seizures by issuing decrees separating 
branch offices of Dutch enterprises from their headquarters 
in Djakarta and placing all such property under military pro­
tection, Sukarno stood by while the seizures seriously 
weakened the Indonesian economy and unemployment increased 
at an alarming rate, Java and other islands dependent on 
food imports began to suffer a severe shortage of food as 
Dutch-owned ships were seized, Sukarno, in answer, declared 
that the-people■must ■ "make sacrifices" in the struggle to 
secure Western New Guinea or West Irian. These events, how­
ever, evoked bitter responses from Dr. Hatta and military 
and civilian leaders on the outer islands which were so de­
pendent on trade with the Western nations, especially the 
Netherlands.
Throughout the vicissitudes of domestic affairs, Su­
karno was successful in modifying the course of foreign 
relations. Previously, Indonesia had refused to become 
involved in the "Gold War" between East and West, although 
it expressed, on every occasion, its solidarity with other 
Asian and African states. In 1955 Indonesia had hosted the 
Bandung Conference which formulated the Afro-Asian viewpoint 
on a number of important issues involving international 
affairs. After the introduction of "Guided Democracy," 
however, Sukarno appeared to move closer to the Communist 
bloc of nations.
Of the Western nations with whom it had relations, the
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Netherlands most concerned Indonesia. The "Roundtable” Con­
ference had provided a framework within which it was hoped 
the two nations might preserve the special relationship which 
past association and considerable economic interests seemed 
to make appropriate. Unfortunately, events prevented these 
paper arrangements from becoming a reality. The implication 
of the Dutch in regional conflict and the question of West 
Irian proved to be insurmountable obstacles. The Indonesian 
Government had unilaterally abrogated the Union as early as 
1956• following the breakdown of the talks on West Irian.
One of Sukarno's major political tactics during periods of 
domestic instability was to divert interest from internal 
affairs to the external conflict with the Dutch over West 
Irian, and, later, confrontation with Malaysia. Although 
such confrontations may have encouraged national integration 
and pride, it was at the same time very costly in terms of 
money and energy. In spite of this fact, Sukarno continued 
to sever economic and political links with the former colonial 
power, as well as other Western nations. As a result, there 
was a steady withdrawal of Dutch citizens and capital from 
Indonesia. This proved an unwise policy in light of the few 
trained native personnel and limited capital to take their 
places. By December, 1957 only 50#000 Netherlands citizens 
were left, including 30,000 Eurasians.
Sukarno justified his orientation and activities toward 
the Dutch and other Western nations on the basis that new 
foreign investments and continued Dutch interests in Indonesia
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were relics of the hated colonial past. Yet, the failure of 
Sukarno and other postwar Indonesian governments to alleviate 
the severe economic pressures greatly contributed to the decline 
of liberal democracy. Material expectations were high follow­
ing the revolution and the central government was expected to 
lead the way to a rapidly expanding volume of goods and ser­
vices. Progress was not made, however, because of the intense 
rivalries between forces that were in a position to effect eco­
nomic changes. The building up of a new economic system could 
not be left to chance. Consistent planning and control were 
necessary. While, the leaders of the outer islands called for 
increased Western aid and capital, the PNI, along with other 
Javanese nationalists, called for an Indonesianization of the 
economy. Considering the elitist nature of Indonesian politics 
and the absence of real political pressures from the great bulk 
of the masses, it would seem that some sort of accommodation 
could have been made between these two viewpoints. Moderation 
sind accommodation, however, require a "prudent" leadership with 
a realistic outlook on political issues.
Further tensions between Java and the outer islands were 
caused by the Central Governments decision in late 1957 to end 
their long toleration of barter trade carried on by the outer 
islands without going through central machinery of the state. 
This action seemed to touch the dissident provinces at a vital 
point and seems to have induced their leaders to bring matters 
to a head.
On February 15, 1958 the formation of a Revolutionary
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Government of the Republic of Indonesia (P.R.R.I) which was 
fully sovereign internally and externally was announced by 
regional military commander, Colonel Hussein. It became 
obvious that the military commanders of Central Sumatra and 
North Sulawesi were fully behind the proclamation. Previously, 
the regional dissidents had presented the Central Government 
with a five-day ultimatum either to withdraw the mandate of 
the extra-parliamentary Djuanda Cabinet and designate Hatta 
and the Sultan of Jogjakarta as formateurs of a new cabinet, 
or to see the establishment of a separate state. The Djakarta 
Government refused to honor the ultimatum and dismissed the 
leading army officers who were involved.
The Central Government stood firm in the face of rebel 
demands and Government air attacks against rebel territories 
began on February 21. Troops moved in on March 7, The 
Government declared the rebellion at an end after the fall 
of Menado in North Sulawesi during June. Nevertheless, rebel 
activity continued in the form of persistent guerilla warfare 
both in Central Sumatra and North Sulawesi. The rather rapid 
removal of the regional threat to the Central Government 
greatly strengthened the position of both Sukarno and the 
central army leadership in Djakarta. This, in turn, enabled 
Sukarno to strengthen the machinery of "guided democracy" and 
encouraged greater participation by the military in political 
affairs.
The P.R.R.I. rebellion had international repercussions.
The Djakarta Government asserted that the rebels were receiving
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assistance from the United States and Nationalist China. The 
Soviet and Chinese Communist Governments attributed the rebellion 
to United States intervention and sought to aggravate Indonesian 
resentment.
There is a haziness surrounding the actual activities and 
motivations of these external forces. At a press conference on
May 20, United States Secretary of State Dulles, said that Mthe
United States itself a nation which has suffered civil war,*1 be­
lieved the Indonesian situation should be dealt with as an "In-
33donesian matter without intrusion from without. It has been
substantiated, however, that the P.R.R,I*army commanders were
receiving some American arms, which meant at least some measure
3 h.
of approval by the United States Government.
The Failure of Liberal Democracy
During the revolution and the early phase of independence, 
Indonesian leaders, reflecting a Western outlook, attempted to 
create a system of liberal democracy. There were many obstacles 
in the pursuit of this goal. The immense diversity of the coun­
try presented serious problems for the functioning of parliamentary 
politics. Within a few years, the attempt was abandoned and a 
more authoritarian polity was introduced. Leaders who had strong 
commitments to constitutional democracy had been few in number 
and eventually they were replaced by men who were willing to
33-'-'Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, op. cit. , 
p. 586.
•^Ibid.. p. 586.
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see the new system decline, men who concerned themselves less 
with the control of political conflict between opposing groups 
and more with its manipulation. There was an absence of an 
overarching cooperation at the elite, level that would make it 
possible to bridge the deep cleavages separating regional, 
cultural# and religious groups. Intense power struggles 
among leaders and parties did not permit the elite function 
of basic social system integration and the organization of 
social demands for society as a whole. In this kind of po­
litical climate, liberal democracy is almost certain to fail.
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding chapters have been an attempt to present 
Indonesia as one of the new developing nations of Asia and 
Africa. These countries are involved in rapid and fundamen­
tal change as they seek to adapt predominantly traditional 
organization to new secular goals of national integration 
and development. Almost all of them have experienced vary­
ing degrees of political, social, and economic instability 
as new institutions and modes of interaction are being intro 
duced. The primary task of nation-building has been made 
more difficult by the fact that many are plural societies, 
composed of competing minority groups thrown together by 
Western colonial expansion. In these culturally plural na­
tions, deep cleavages divide isolated, self-contained, in­
clusive groups. The widespread unrest obtaining from these 
conditions has fostered the growth of authoritarian govern­
ment at the expense of new liberal democratic orders. The 
question is often asked if it is possible for these plural 
states to simultaneously support the goals of economic and 
social modernization and maintain a stable and effective po­
litical democracy.
The present study takes the position that democratic 
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orders face serious obstacles in the culturally plural socie­
ties where clearly discernible and mutually-reinforcing clea­
vages between groups preclude a "common social demand" regard­
ing desirable goals. The more extreme the cleavages and mu­
tual isolation, the greater the danger to the system. The 
study further proposes that if political democracies are to 
survive in these nations, there must be at least a narrow 
consensus among the leadership with regard to commitment and 
loyalty to that type of system. Elite cooperation requires 
a "prudent leadership" willing to turn basic loyalty to the 
system into practical results. Moderation and accommodation 
are necessary ingredients if sound economic and social poli­
cies are to be implemented. The overarching cooperation among 
members of the elite is substituted for the cross-cutting 
associational links found in more mature system. The inte­
grating function of the political leadership becomes the 
crucial factor in the maintenance of the liberal democratic 
polity. As cross-cutting links are built among constituent 
elements, the problems of basic system integration and organi­
zation of social demands become less pressing. Leaders can 
then concentrate on the satisfaction of these demands for the 
society as a whole.
The study therefore proposes that the successes and failures 
of the new systems must be viewed in light of the orientations 
and activities of the political leadership and its organiza­
tions with regard to the changes that are occurring. The 
underlying assumption is that political dynamics in the
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developing plural states become more intelligible if analyzed 
in relation to both societal structure and the response made 
to structural conditions by political leaders and their organi­
zations. In other words* some of the structural characteris­
tics of societies like Indonesia may or may hot be conflict- 
producing on the national level. Whether they are is often 
dependent on how they are manipulated by competing individuals 
and/or groups within society. One must pay special attention 
to the "organizational strategies" that are employed by the 
elite in its effort to make social and cultural groups func­
tional with respect to the changes that are taking place on 
the political level. Leaders often exacerbate conflict between 
groups in order to gain support from certain elements.
The major substantive concern is with Indonesia's failure 
to maintain a parliamentary democracy and the subsequent transi­
tion to the alternative system of "guided" or tutelary democracy, 
a variant of authoritarian rule which concentrates power in the 
hands of the executive branch of government and other extra- 
parliamentary forces. A previously widely diffused political 
power became centered in President Sukarno and the military.
An examination of postrevolutionary Indonesia indicates that 
the political leadership was unable to provide purposeful and 
authoritative government, and, in the process, overcome the 
problems inherent in cultural pluralism, decolonization, and 
modernization. In the wake of the new system's defeat lay 
unresolved issues having their origins in the traditional and 
colonial past, extreme internal disunity, and, finally in the
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open rebellion between regions.
It is evident the Indonesian societal structure has great 
capacity for conflict and instability. The elite proved in­
capable and often unwilling to control this capacity. The 
study reveals that conflict between groups and regions was 
often activated by leaders as they competed among themselves 
for power following the departure of the Dutch. Social align­
ments that in themselves were conflict-producing were intensi­
fied by individuals and organizations bent on articulating 
their own goals which excluded entirely the goals of others.
A circular effect took place as different segments of the 
elite stressed their ideological positions in order to appeal 
to units of the electorate. As this occurred, cleavages within 
the elite deepened and accommodation and cooperation became 
almost impossible to achieve.
During the nationalist struggle, the Indonesian people 
were drawn together by their common endeavor for statehood 
and the years of bloodshed and suffering. Potentially divi­
sive elements within the society began to surface, however, 
with the granting of independence by the Dutch. One serious 
problem was the wide gap which separated a relatively small 
Westernized elite from the large, unarticulate mass of people. 
Another problem was the extremely fragmented political culture 
of the country. Two main currents of political thought and 
action stand out. The first is the Javanese Tradition, char­
acteristic of the ethnic Javanese, the largest of the cultural 
groups. It stresses harmony, continuity, a desire for consensus
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of opinion that is reached by mutual discussion and with a 
minimum of friction, a strong element of messianic hope, and 
a need for expressive or emotive politics which encouraged 
a rather radical nationalism.
The second is that of the Moslem Tradition, found mainly 
in the outer islands where the more devout Islam adherents 
are located. It emphasizes a mixture of religious and secular 
life and that one cannot be divorced from the other. Inde­
pendent political and economic activity are valued in opposi­
tion to the more collectivist spirit of the Javanese. Rein­
forcing this cleavage are the regional differences between 
Java and the outer islands that have existed for thousands of 
years. The exporting outer region was fearful of domination 
by the central government located in Java, an importing region 
containing two-thirds of the total population. Social unrest 
began to build up as conflict between the two regions remained 
unresolved. It was necessary that some measure of regional 
autonomy be allowed while national integrating institutions 
were being introduced. The elite split on the basis of this 
issue, and, in turn, began to exacerbate the conflict. It was 
obvious that the leadership could not satisfy its integrating 
functions,
A very first requirement of nation-building is that of 
formulating a national ideology that will be acceptable to the 
various groups. If it is to be acceptable, it must be one which 
the people recognize as their own, an outlook that expresses 
the nation*s past and present. In implementing the national
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ideologyf a strong and undivided» though not necessarily au­
thoritarian, leadership is required.
The Indonesian elite tended to group itself around exist­
ing cleavages between cultural, religious, and regional minori­
ties instead of concentrating on a new ideological framework 
based on theprinciples of the new parliamentary order. Con­
sequently, leaders and parties found it necessary to give 
their primary allegiance to the goals and values of these 
blocs rather than the constitutional system itself. Parties 
became a means to be used in gaining political power for com­
peting ideological programs and not as a means to reach the 
goal of national integration and participation.
An excellent example of elite ideological conflict in­
volved manipulation of the Islamic versus secular state issue 
for political gain. Controversy was sparked by Sukarno's 
speech on January 27, 1953 at Amuntai in strongly Islam South 
Kalimantan. In response to a banner which asked, "Indonesia 
a National State or an Islamic State?" President Sukarno said:
The state we want is a national state consisting 
of all Indonesia. If we establish a state based 
on Islam, many areas whose population is not 
Islamic . . . will secede.^
This speech caused strong protest among the Moslems of the 
outer islands who interpreted it as a threat to the Islam re­
ligion. Isa Anshary, a Masjumi leader, called it undemocratic,
^Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, op. cit., 
p. 281. Taken from Antara, January 29* 1953.
munconstitutional, and in conflict with the ideology of Islam, 
which is professed by the great majority of Indonesian citi- 
zens. Others claimed the President's speech had sown "seeds 
of separatism" and was overstepping the presidential role as 
provided for by the 1950 Constitution. From that point, the 
wedge between Sukarno's national ideology of Pantja Sila and 
the Islamic State of the devout Moslems became more acute.
Elite solidarity was severely disturbed and the gap between 
Javanese and non-Javanese leaders widened. It became impossi­
ble for the PNI and Masjumi to cooperate. The 1955 General 
Election heightened the issue as Java and the outer islands 
tended to group themselves around these alternative ideologies. 
It was apparent that there was little agreement on even basic 
political values. Sukarno constantly made reference to the 
political immobilism of the Parliament. As early as 1951* 
he told a Makassar audience that he had received many letters 
saying that "if the existing situation continued they would 
prefer a dictatorship."-^ In 1952 he said in Solo that Indo­
nesia was in a political crisis "because of our unsettled po­
litical views and the parties' jockeying for power - with the 
result that the situation is seen as a failure of democracy
II
and that the people want a dictatorship." Talk of a military
^Ibid., p. 281. Taken from Aneta, February 2, 1953.
^Ibid., p. 327. Taken from Antara, November 12, 1951.
Ibid., p. 327. Taken from Sin Po, September 23, 1952.
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dictatorship was common during the October 17 affair (1952) 
when military intervention caused the fall of the government.
The system was increasingly criticized as something that was 
culturally foreign, based on numbers and oblivious to matters 
of quality. Yet no faction was strong enough, nor could 
afford to, come forward with concrete proposals that would be 
successful in bridging the gaps between societal groups.
Elite fragmentation was aggravated by a split between 
skill groups which reinforced the cultural, regional, and re­
ligious cleavages. The study has used Feith's concepts of 
"administrators" and "solidarity makers" to describe the two 
skill groups. On the one hand, there were the "administra­
tors" who were concerned with specific administrative and 
economic problems and who attempted to find solutions to 
rather limited issues. Many of these were from the outer 
islands, pro-Western, and committed to the new system of 
parliamentary democracy. They were, in the main, rather un­
exciting and practical leaders. On the other hand, the 
"solidarity makers" devoted themselves to the problems of 
national integration, the construction of a national ideology, 
and the manipulation of the masses, They were not concerned 
with the legal and administrative ends of government.
Government was largely in the hands of the "administrators" 
during the early years of independence. These men failed to 
gain sufficient power to enact needed reforms and policies.
The "solidarity makers" such as Sukarno assumed more importance 
in the intervening years. Many were not committed to Western
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parliamentary democracy. They liked to indulge in expressive 
politics and were bent on gaining power on their own terms.
They believed that if they cooperated with the "administrators” 
they would be perpetuating a system that was not suitable for 
Indonesia. Without a minimal consensus between these factions* 
political democracy was doomed.
Some men who were sufficiently committed to the new sy­
stem were often excluded entirely from government on the 
grounds that they had cooperated with the Dutch and were there­
fore "lackies of the imperialists.” Many of these people had 
viewed their administrative abilities as a means of improving 
themselves and helping their nation to become part of the world 
culture v/ith its modem technology and industrialization.
After the departure of the Dutch, however, political power was 
not handed to such persons. It was given to those who had 
attacked the old system and many of them proved incompetent 
to handle the affairs of state for a modem nation, especially 
the "solidarity makers.”
A large portion of the leadership also satisfied itself 
by playing the elite game, that is being at the top of the pile, 
with few visible results. This was particularly the case with 
many of the expressive leaders. They liked their high status 
and the ubiquitous Mercedes cars, but they had little feeling 
that to engage in politics is to formulate and implement 
policies. For these men who had learned their politics in the 
furor of the nationalist struggle, to be in power was exciting 
and a world full of symbolic meanings and slogans. Their
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satisfaction resulted from the manipulation of mass audiences. 
There is great danger in this ’fascist” type of political 
activity in that leaders may not be able to control the ideo­
logically-activated mass. By the early 1960*8, this was ob­
viously the situation. Yet, it was disheartening for these 
’’symbolic leaders” to find that after self-rule began, politics 
demanded more substance such as five-year economic plans that 
did not usually work out. They continued to ideologize, 
missing almost completely the point that the only way to 
effectively assert authority and gain legitimacy is by ade­
quately performing the business of government.
Nationalist slogans v/ere used as a rallying cry to di­
vert popular discontent toward various scapegoats, namely 
the "administrators" who wanted to "negotiate" with the 
Western world. For instance, Indonesia desperately needed 
foreign capital and aid in order to make use of her consider­
able natural resources such as petroleum and nickel. But 
none of the governments were able to come to terms with the 
question of foreign investments. The "administrators" were 
not able to gain sufficient power to provide foreign investors 
with protection against unjustified hostility and seizure.
They lacked the ability to implement unpopular measures such 
as returning the Sumatran oil wells to Royal Dutch Shell.
As the economic situation deteriorated, poverty, unemployment, 
and inflation increased. Social unrest was at an all-time 
high. In the face of these problems, Sukarno and other "sym­
bolic leaders" (usually representing the Javanese viewpoint)
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called for the nationalization of all foreign enterprises and 
the outster of the-Dutch altogether. Anyone supporting foreign 
investment was labeled a neo-colonial who wanted to "dam” up 
Indonesia's revolution and return the country to colonialism. 
This expressive brand of politics eventually reached the point 
of xenophobia with its inclination toward utopianism, ego- 
centricity, and the distortion of the outside world.
These criticisms are not meant to infer that a certain 
amount of charismatic leadership and expressive politics were 
not necessary to heal the scars left over from the colonial 
period and to integrate a diversive territory. The study 
has already proposed that a strong national ideology is an 
essential feature of the post-independence period. But 
somewhere along the line xenophobia has to end. A new group 
of leaders must emerge who are of a more pragmatic mind, re­
solved to develop and support a more realistic political and 
economic course. The petroleum in Sumatra will have to stay 
in the ground unless some measure of foreign investment is 
permitted. Cooperation between the different factions of 
the elite could have enabled the country to effect some kind 
of program which would allow and at the same time control 
foreign capital.
A political system does not operate in a vacuum. Yet 
the study demonstrates that Indonesia’s leaders were largely 
divorced from and not responsive to the social environment 
of the larger society. They were not '’prudent*' in their 
handling of the conflict potential between Javanese and
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non-Javanese, between the central government and the outer 
islands. They failed to see the necessity for an economic 
program that would allow some measure of foreign capital and 
aid, a program that would accommodate the interests of both 
Java and the outer islands. Basic cleavages within the so­
ciety were deepened by the orientations and activities of 
the elite. In turn, cleavages within the leadership in­
creased.
The study indicates, as stated, that the most important 
structural problem confronting the postrevolutionary leaders 
v/as the cleavage between the ethnic Javanese from the vari­
ous groups on the outer islands. The regional dispute points 
to the limits of the revolutionary nationalism in the develop­
ing countries. After the removal of the Dutch, there appeared 
to be no overriding nationalist feelings capable of encom­
passing the two territories. Where was the common denomi­
nator? Although leaders like Sukarno attempted to articu­
late what they called all-Indonesian goals, they were, in 
fact, representatives of subgroups and were seen as such by 
other subgroups. The assertion of onefs goals, i.e., the 
army or the Javanese, v/as seen as a threat to others. Where 
there is no overarching concept of national identity and de­
mand, there is uncertainty and insecurity. Everyone is a 
minority, clinging to pre-existing social and cultural divi­
sions. Pov/er is so diffuse that it becomes negative in quality 
with one source cancelling out another.
If the major conflict between Java and the outer islands,
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which encompassed religious, economic, political, and social 
differences, had been settled, there is every reason to be­
lieve that constitutional democracy might have survived. Under­
lying all of the regional complaints lay the lack of meaning­
ful provision for self-government, especially in fiscal matters. 
Yet, as late as 1957* no definite local government law had 
been passed by Parliament. Make-shift arrangements continued 
to prevail. The central government was able to quell the al­
most constant civil and military conflict, but it did not 
redress the economic and political grievances which prompted 
many of them. Eventually, those men who were interested in 
maintaining parliamentary democracy were replaced by a group 
of men who were less committed to the system and more willing 
to manipulate rather than control social instability. With 
no effective opposition, it was relatively easy for President 
Sukarno to introduce his "konsepsi" of "guided democracy," 
backed by military force.
Indonesia is, by geography, history, and culture, one of 
the world's most diverse nations. To build a nation-state out 
of a melange of peoples and lands is indeed an exceedingly 
difficult task. A certain amount of political instability is 
inherent in the process of achieving unity in the face of ex­
treme disunity. Only a "prudent leadership" which recognizes 
the diversity and makes accommodation for a measure of dissent 
which conforms to natural divisions can assure legitimacy and 
stability. If these leaders are firmly committed to a demo­
cratic order, it may be possible to maintain the system during
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the initial period of turbulence following independence. By 
the time that reality is more in line with rising expecta­
tions, the system will hopefully have gained a firm foothold.
APPENDIX
THE CONSTITUTION OF 19^5 *
Preamble
Whereas independence is the right of every nation, 
therefore colonialism must be abolished from the face of the 
earth as it is contrary to the dictates of human nature and 
justice.
And the struggle for Indonesian independence has now 
reached that glorious moment, having led the Indonesian people 
safely to the threshold of independence for an Indonesian state 
which is free, united, sovereign, just, and prosperous.
With the blessing of God Almighty and impelled by the 
noble ideal of a free national life, the Indonesian people do 
hereby declare their independence.
Further, in order to establish a government of the 
State of Indonesia v/hich shall protect the entire Indonesian 
people and the whole of the land of Indonesia, and in order to 
promote the general welfare, to improve the standard of living, 
and to participate in establishing a world order founded upon 
freedom, eternal peace, and social justice; therefore the Inde­
pendence of the Indonesian People is embodied in a Constitution 
of the State of Indonesia, which Constitution shall establish 
a Republic of the State of Indonesia in which the people are 
sovereign and which is based upon: Belief in the One Supreme 
God, a just and civilized humanitarianism, the unity of Indo­
nesia, and a democracy guided by the wisdom arising from con­
sultation and representation, which democracy shall ensure 
social justice for the whole Indonesian people.
CHAPTER I 
FORM AND SOVEREIGNTY 
Article I
1. The State of Indonesia is a unitary state and in form a 
republic.
*1945 Constitution taken from copy used by Daniel 
Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, op. cit., pp. 290- 
298.
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2. Sovereignty is vested in the people and exercised fully by
the People*s Consultative Assembly (Madjelis Permusjawaratan 
Rakjat).
CHAPTER II
The People's Consultative Assembly 
(Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat)
Article 2
1. The People's Consultative Assembly consists of the members 
of the Council of Prepresentatives (Dewan Perwakllan Rakjat, 
Parliament) and delegates of the regions and other groups 
in accordance with rules prescribed by law.
2. The People's Consultative Assembly shall assemble in the 
capital at least once every five years.
3. All decisions of the People's Consultative Assembly shall 
be taken by majority vote.
Article 3
The People's Consultative Assembly shall decide upon 
the Constitution and determine the basic outlines of state 
policy.
CHAPTER III 
The Executive 
Article h
1. The President of the Republic of Indonesia is vested with 
the power of Government in accordance with the Constitu­
tion,
2. In exercising his reponsibilities, the President is as­
sisted by a Vice-President.
Article 5
1. The President, acting with the consent of the Council of 
Representatives, exercises legislative powers.
2. The President shall enact such government regulations 
(peraturan pemerintah) as are necessary for the proper exe 
cution of the laws.
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Article 6
1. The President shall be a native-born Indonesian.
2, The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by 
the People's Consultative Assembly by majority vote.
Article 7
The President and Vice-President hold office for a 
term of five years, and thereafter are eligible for re-election.
Article 8
In the event of the President's death, resignation, re­
moval from office, or inability to exercise his duties during 
the term of his office, he is succeeded by the Vice-President 
until that term is expired.
Article 9
Before assuming their offices, the President and Vice- 
President shall, by religious oath or affirmation, solemnly deo 
clare before the People's Consultative Assembly or the Council 
of Representatives as follows:
Oath of the President (Vice-President)s "I swear before 
God, that to the best of my ability, I shall faithfully and con­
scientiously fulfill the duties of the President of the Repub­
lic of Indonesia, maintain the Constitution and faithfully 
execute all laws and regulations, and dedicate myself to the 
service of State and Nation.M
Affirmation of the President (Vice-President): ”1 do 
solemnly affirm, that to the best: of my ability, I shall faith­
fully and conscientiously fulfill the duties of the President 
of the Republic of Indonesia,maintain the Constitution and 
faithfully execute all laws and regulations, and dedicate my­
self to the service of State and Nation."
Article 10
The President holds the highest authority over the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Article 11
The President, with the consent of the Council of Rep­
resentatives, declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties 
with other states.
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Article 12
The President is empowered to proclaim martial law.
The conditions governing a proclamation of martial law, and 
the consequences thereof, shall be prescribed by law.
Article 13
1. The President appoints diplomatic representatives and 
consuls.
2. The President receives the diplomatic representatives of 
foreign states.
Article 1^
The President has authority to grant pardon, amnesty, 
abolition, and rehabilitation.
Article 15
The President has authority to bestow titles, decora­
tions for merit, and other marks of honor.
CHAPTER IV
The Supreme Advisory Council 
(Dev;sun Pertimbangan Agung)
Article 16
1. The composition of the Supreme Advisory Council shall be 
determined by law.
2. The Supreme Advisory Council is responsible for giving ad­
vice on matters submitted to it by the President, and has 
the right to submit proposals to the Government,
CHAPTER V 
The Ministries 
Article 1?
1. The President is assisted by Ministers of the State.
2. The Ministers are appointed and discharged by the President,
3. The Ministers direct Departments of Government.
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CHAPTER VI 
Local Government 
Article 18
The division of the territory of Indonesia into large 
and small units and the composition of their government shall 
be prescribed by law, with due regard for and observance of 
the principle of consultation and the traditional rights of 
areas with extraordinary status.
CHAPTER VII 
The Council of Representatives
Article 19
1. The composition of the Council of Representatives shall be 
prescribed by law.
2. The Council of Representatives shall assemble at least once 
every year.
Article 20
1. Every statute requires the consent of the Council of Repre­
sentatives.
2. In the event that a bill is rejected by the Council of Repre­
sentatives, that bill may not be submitted for a second
time during the same session of the Council of Repre­
sentatives.
Article 21
1. Members of the Council of Representatives have the right 
to initiate bills.
2. In the event that such a bill is approved by the Council 
of Representatives but rejected by the President, that bill 
may not be submitted for a second time during the same 
session of the Council of Representatives.
Article 22
1. In cases of emergency, the President has the authority to 
enact government regulations in place of statutes.
2. Government regulations thus enacted shall be submitted to 
the next session of the Council of Representatives for 
ratification.
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3. In the event that such government regulations are not rati- 
field, they are revoked.
CHAPTER VIII 
Finance 
Article 23
1. A budget of receipts and expenditures shall be determined 
each year by the Council of Representatives. In the event 
that the Council of Representatives does not approve the 
budget proposed by the Government, then the budget for the 
preceding year remains in force.
2. Every tax imposed for the purpose of government revenues 
shall be based upon a statute.
3. The form and denominations of currency shall be determined 
by law.
k, Other matters concerning public finance shall be prescribed
by law.
5. To examine all matters pertaining to public finance, a
Financial Auditing Office (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan) shall 
be established by law. The results of its audits shall be 
presented to the Council of Representatives.
CHAPTER IX 
The Judiciary 
Article 2k
1. Judicial authority is vested in a Supreme Court and such
other judicial bodies as are established by law.
2. The organization and competence of the courts shall be
determined by law.
Article 25
The conditions of appointment and removal from office 
of judges shall be prescribed by law.
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CHAPTER X 
Citizenship 
Article 26
1* Native bom Indonesians and other naturalized according
to law are citizens,
2, The conditions affecting citizenship shall be prescribed
by law.
Article 27
1. All citizens have the same status in law and in government 
and shall, without exception, respect the law and the 
government.
2. Every citizen has the right to work and to a reasonable 
standard of living.
Article 28
The freedom of assembly and association, of expression 
of spoken and written opinion, and similar freedoms shall be 
provided by law.
CHAPTER XI 
Religion 
Article 29
1, The State is based upon Belief in the One Supreme God.
2. The State guarantees the freedom of every inhabitant to 
embrace his own religion and to worship according to his 
religion and his beliefs.
CHAPTER XII 
National Defense 
Article 30
1. Every citizen has the right and the responsibility to par­
ticipate in the defense of the state.
2. Matters concerning defense shall be provided for by law
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CHAPTER XIII 
Education 
Article 31
1. Every citizen has the right to an education.
2. The Government shall provide and manage a system of educa­
tion, which shall be provided for by law.
Article 32
The Government shall promote and develop the national 
culture of Indonesia.
CHAPTER XIV 
Social Welfare 
Article 33
1. The economy shall be organized as a cooperative endeavor 
based on the principle of family life,
2. The State shall control those means of production which are 
important for the State and which dominate the economic 
life of the people.
3. The land, the water, and the natural resources contained 
therein shall be controlled by the State and exploited for 
the greatest prosperity of the people.
Article 3^
The poor and the orphaned shall be cared for by the
State.
CHAPTER XY 
The National Flag and Language 
Article 35
The Indonesian National Flag is the Honroed Red and
White.
Article 36
The national language of Indonesia is Indonesian.
1^0
CHAPTER. XVI 
Amendment of the Constitution 
Article 37
1# In order to amend the Constitution, a quorum of two-thirds 
the membership of the People's Consultative Assembly is 
required.
2. Decisions shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of those 
attending.
Transitional Provisions 
Article I
The Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence 
shall prepare and arrange the transfer of administration to 
the Government of Indonesia.
Article II
All existing state institutions and laws shall remain 
in force so long as new ones have not been created in accord­
ance with this Constitution.
Article III
The President and Vice-President shall be elected ini­
tially by the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence,
Article IV
Before the formation according to this Constitution of 
the People's Consultative Assembly, the Council of Representa­
tives, and the Supreme Advisory Council, their authority shall 
be exercised by the President with the assistance of the Na­
tional Committee,
Additional Provisions
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